Posts
Monday, September 22, 2008
Military intelligence: Iran halfway to first nuclear bomb
Iran is halfway to a nuclear bomb, and Hizbullah, Hamas and Syria are using this period of relative calm to significantly rearm, Brig.-Gen. Yossi Baidatz, the Military Intelligence's head of research, told the cabinet Sunday during a particularly gloomy briefing on the threats facing the country. ....
Oil price jumps $25 in a day
Crude oil prices jumped $25 a barrel on Monday – the largest one-day rise – as financial investors betting on falling oil prices were forced to cover their positions ahead of the expiry of the current benchmark futures contract.
The jump to an intraday high of $130 a barrel – a rise of about $40 a barrel from last week’s low – was exacerbated by a weakening US dollar and data showing weaker supplies from Mexico, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia in recent weeks and surging imports by China. ....
States Make Immigration Arrests Under Fed Program
State Patrol trooper Mike Jamison keeps an action figure of "The Thing" on his passenger seat — a nod to the Fantastic Four, which is what Jamison and three colleagues charged with enforcing immigration law on western Colorado's highways call themselves.
His car also has a DVD burner that documents every traffic stop he makes to provide evidence for potential immigration prosecutions — and catch any racial profiling."If I'm doing something wrong, and not doing what I'm supposed to be doing, I'm going to get caught," Jamison said on a recent ride-along on Interstate 70, a pipeline for immigrant smuggling from the West to Denver and cities farther east.
Colorado's state patrol is among dozens of police agencies nationwide taking advantage of a federal training program to identify and detain suspected illegal immigrants. Since the program began in 2006, these agencies have made more than 68,000 arrests for immigration-related violations, says Carl Rusnok of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
ICE has trained about 800 officers in 18 states to prepare charging documents and issue immigration detainers. Eighty training requests are pending from police departments, state patrols, sheriff's offices and corrections departments. ....
Progress Report on DHS Plans for Transition
by Phil Leggiere
Gaps in preparation and staffing still need to be addressed.
Gaps in preparation and staffing still need to be addressed.
Though most Americans have grown up taking it for granted, the orderly inaugural transitions between political administrations we’re accustomed to represent quite an extraordinary achievement historically. Insuring them even in the best of times has always been a complex challenge. In an era when terrorist organizations avidly search for targets of optimum opportunity to disrupt civil societies, however, that challenge has become even more daunting.
With the first post 9-11 governmental transition just months away the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia late last week held a hearing examining the current status of transitional planning by DHS and other government agencies in advance of 1-20-09.
Speaking for DHS Elaine C. Duke, undersecretary of homeland security, outlined the agency’s current action plan.
With the first post 9-11 governmental transition just months away the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia late last week held a hearing examining the current status of transitional planning by DHS and other government agencies in advance of 1-20-09.
Speaking for DHS Elaine C. Duke, undersecretary of homeland security, outlined the agency’s current action plan.
“In January 2009, the Federal government will undergo a transition from one Administration to the next,” she said. ‘Historically,” she added, “we know terrorists perceive government transitions to be periods of increased vulnerability. The attacks in Madrid in 2004, in London in 2005, and in Glasgow in 2007 all took place during transitions. The first World Trade Center attack in 1993, as well as the September 11th attacks occurred within the first year of new Administrations. At DHS, we are doing everything necessary to ensure we are prepared for the upcoming Presidential transition and that there will be no gaps in our leadership team, planning efforts, or mission success.”
Duke said that transition efforts began in the Spring of 2007 when DHS began identifying critical positions using what she called a “Critical Position Succession Planning template” to ensure a pipeline of successors to the most critical positions within the organization. As part of this process, Duke said, DHS identified senior career civil servants who will assume responsibility for political positions during the time of transition.
In September 2007, Duke added, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff asked the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) to establish an Administration Transition Task Force to provide recommendations and best practices to the Department. The Task Force made several recommendations and grouped their recommendations into seven categories: Threat Awareness, Leadership, Congressional Oversight/Action, Policy, Operations, Succession and Training.
Finally, Duke said that the agency has organized a cadre of individuals including Senior and Deputy Transition Officers who are charged with evaluating internal processes, developing briefing materials to ensure operational effectiveness during the anticipated surge of incoming and exiting employees, and develop and implement a training exercise plan.
“We now have established a transition plan for our components,” Duke concluded, “ ensuring that the top leadership in each component includes career executives who will preserve continuity of operations before, during and after the administration transition. Of our 22 component agencies and program offices, 14 have career Civil Servants in the number one or number two positions while seven component agencies or program offices have only career civil servants in senior leadership positions.”
Acknowledging the efforts DHS has made so far Frank J. Chellino, Panel Chairman for the Department of Homeland Security Presidential Transition Study, National Academy of Public Administration, called DHS “well along in its transition training especially given that it is a young agency with a critical national mission and going through its first Presidential transition.”
Nonetheless pointed out what he saw as the major gaps in planning thus far. Specifically Chellino noted that the Academy recommends that DHS shift more executives to field locations in immigration and border management agencies and change non-career headquarters deputy officials, FEMA regional administrators and other officials to career executives.
Chellino also cited what he described as “gaps in DHS” executive staffing including, high turnover, many vacant positions, and a lack of ethnic and gender diversity. (Compiler's note: Someone please explain to the public just exactly what does "gender diversity" have to do with our national security.)
“DHS' actions are positive,” Chellino concluded, “ but there remain important areas that must be addressed if the department is to be completely prepared. To the greatest extent possible, incoming DHS leadership - including the Secretary and key staff—must be in place on Inauguration Day or shortly thereafter. This requires the support and cooperation of other federal agencies with background check and clearance responsibilities, as well as the Congress given it confirmation role and responsibilities.”
Picking up on Chellino’s points regarding congressional responsibility, John Rollins Specialist in Terrorism and National Security Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division The Congressional Research Service outlined what he believed are crucial areas for Congressional guidance over the next six to twelve months before and immediately after the inaugural.
“When one looks at the possibility of an attack occurring during the presidential transition period, combined with the suspected need for Al Qaeda to prove its continuing viability as an organization,” Rollins explained, “the enemy may see the upcoming transfer of power as too enticing to resist, and may choose to attempt a disruptive strike during this unique time in American politics rather than waiting for more advantageous conditions to attempt an attack.”
To address these concerns Rollins recommended that Congress request the current Administration to provide: the names of agency leaders responsible for making national security related decisions during the presidential transition period; briefings on the possible risks to the presidential transition process; information about the current status of transition planning activities, briefings about the Administration’s efforts to engage and collaborate with prospective new Administration senior security officials; and information about the funds appropriated for the purposes of the current presidential transition and how these monies are being used to support national and homeland security activities.
After January 20 Congressional support to the incoming Administration, Rollins, should include: prioritizing hearings for new Administration nominated political appointees who will have significant national security responsibilities; working with the new Administration to understand its national security priorities and, where applicable, have the changes in policies and programs reflected in the 2009 budget; and passing the FY2009 appropriations bills without undue delay.
“Other activities Congress may wish to consider, during the presidential transition period,” Rollins suggested, include “ providing a sense of the Congress resolution that notes the importance of effective and collaborative activities between the departing Administration and the incoming Administration; holding a special session of Congress soon after the election to ascertain what the outgoing and incoming Administrations have accomplished and will do with respect to transition-related activities; and quickly assigning new and existing Members of Congress to committees focusing on national security issues to allow these individuals to have the opportunity to understand better the issues for which they have oversight.”
Ms. Patricia McGinnis, President and Chief Executive Officer , Council for Excellence in Government, pointed out two additional areas of risk that will, she said, require leadership beyond the scope of DHS.
“First,” she said, “ from my vantage point, the training and exercises to prepare acting career officials and incoming appointees to assume their collaborative homeland security responsibilities across federal agencies do not seem to be as well coordinated as they should be. For the overall transition, each department and agency has named a senior career transition coordinator and the Deputy Director for Management at OMB is bringing them together to facilitate collaboration.”
“Also,” she added, “ the national security professionals training initiative is well underway and is convening leaders from security related agencies to focus on transition. And, the National Exercise Program, led by FEMA conducts scenario based exercises involving those with operational responsibilities from across the federal government (depending on the scenario). Nevertheless, there are many exercises and training programs that are not coordinated and as far as I know there is not a clearinghouse or repository of such activities and resources, to encourage coordination or “not reinventing the wheel” many times over.”
Finally, she warned, “very seldom do federal officials train or exercise with state and local leaders and first responders or private sector leaders. In our view, training and exercising together is the best way to ensure seamless, effective enterprise wide response to a major emergency. As our friends on the front lines at the local level often say, “you don’t want to be exchanging business cards during an emergency”. This is work to be done, related both to the transition period and our ongoing security.”
Beyond this McGinnis emphasized that addressing the potentially lengthy gap between the inauguration of the next president and the confirmation of key appointed leaders in key national and homeland security positions, is also crucial. “The Secretaries of Homeland Security, Defense, State and a few others, if not the whole cabinet, should be confirmed on Inauguration Day,” she said. “Then, they should not be “home alone”, with few if any confirmed deputies, undersecretaries and other critical appointees on board. The Executive Branch is working to expedite the security clearance process and according to the initial plan submitted to the President on April 30, 2008 by the Joint Security and suitability Reform Team, the time for security clearance determinations is down, on average, from 162 days in 2005 to 112 days currently. The goal is to reduce the time to 60 days, after reforms have been implemented and the investigative capacity is expanded.”
Previous administrative transitions have all had their challenges. In the past, however, incoming administrations and the federal bureaucracy more widely had some margin of error in their time frame for getting up to speed. With the stakes now higher than ever all participants in the transitional process now truly do need to be “ready on day one”. Insuring that this is so will require each critical agency and each manager within them to get out of their comfort zone in terms of cross-agency collaboration.
The Need to Contain Iran & Hezbollah Before it is Too Late
By Elias Bejjani
When it comes to Iran and Hezbollah, is the free world going to repeat the same “wait and see” cowardice scenario they applied with the Hitler-Nazi phenomenon?
Jihad and the Growing Surrender of American Counterterrorism
(Compiler's note: Absolutely a must read article)
By Jeffrey Imm
In the "stealth Jihad" war of ideas over the past year, one American institution after another has signaled its willingness to surrender to the advocates of Islamic supremacism – our homeland security, our military, and our law enforcement. Islamic supremacist groups have "guided" such American government organizations to create a "terror lexicon" that excludes "Jihad," to promote "progress" over "liberty," to blackball those who would confront the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic supremacists, to "train" our law enforcement, and to openly promote engagement with Islamic supremacist organizations as part of counterterrorism tactics.
Six months ago, the growing surrender in the war of ideas by America's counterterrorism community was seen by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) memorandum endorsing the DHS "terror lexicon" prohibiting the use of the terms such as "Jihad," "Islamist," and "mujahedeen." This milestone was part of a trend that has been growing for nearly two years. Since the November 2006 mid-term elections resulting in a Democrat Congressional majority, a growing number in counterterrorist organizations have been moving towards promoting analysts that support negotiations, rather than confrontation, with Islamic supremacists. The belief among some is that, should the Democrat Party win the presidency, a new Democrat administration would seek such "engagement" policies. As the presidential campaign has heated up, this emphasis has accelerated in some counterterrorist organizations, which fear ending up on the outside looking in.
However, over the past seven years, a vacuum of strategic war planning on Islamic supremacism by the U.S. military, intelligence, and executive branch (seen in today's "war on extremism") has made America increasingly dependent on what little strategic thinking that has been available from the counterterrorism community. The growing surrender of counterterrorism groups to the policies of appeasement and "engagement," legitimizing Islamic supremacists, undermines one of the last remaining "strategic voices" on Jihad. Increasingly, the numbers are shrinking in counterterrorism communities who seek confrontation against Jihadists and Islamic supremacists; some voices are being marginalized and silenced. This growing surrender will require average American citizens to increase their activism in demanding that their government representatives confront Jihad and Islamic supremacism.
September 23rd will mark yet another milestone in the growing surrender of America's counterterrorism organizations, as Capitol Hill will be used to promote the ideas of those who think America should "engage" with Islamic supremacist groups.
Using Capitol Hill to Promote Appeasement of Jihad and Islamic Supremacism
One day after the seventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the Counterterrorism Blog announced a panel discussion to be held at 10 AM on Tuesday, September 23, 2008 at a U.S. Capitol building facility in Washington, D.C. (2255 Rayburn House Office Building). This discussion will provide a platform for Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank to promote their views that by engaging with Islamic supremacists and Jihadists, the West can dissuade them from pursuing al Qaeda-style terrorism.
Peter Bergen is associated with the New America Foundation and Paul Cruickshank is a contributing expert for the Counterterrorism Blog; both are also research fellows with the New York University's Center on Law and Security.
The September 23rd meeting entitled "The Jihadists' Revolt Against Al Qaeda" is being co-sponsored by the Counterterrorism Blog and by the New America Foundation (described by Washington Post writer David Ignatius in February as "a liberal think tank.") The meeting is to discuss Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank's New Republic (TNR) June 2008 article "The Unraveling," where they ostensibly argue that there is a "jihadist revolt against Bin Laden." This is the basis for their argument that engagement with Islamic supremacists and anti-al Qaeda Jihadists will make "America safer," and that in a war of ideas with Islamic supremacists, "it is their ideas, not the West's, that matter."
Per my July 16th response to their New Republic article, Bergen and Cruickshank use the example of Sayyid Imam Al Sharif's (aka "Dr. Fadl") rejection of al Qaeda as justification for such a policy. What they don't report is the rest of the story on Al-Sharif. In fact, Al-Sharif continues to support Jihad in Afghanistan and Iraq, where American soldiers are in harm's way, and Al-Sharif continues to support Jihad against Israel. Bergen and Cruickshank also don't report Al-Sharif's continued support for Islamic supremacism and the Taliban, where he states: "Jihad in Afghanistan will lead to the creation of an Islamic state with the triumph of the Taliban, God willing." Al-Sharif's support of Jihad is for the same Taliban that supported Bin Laden's 9/11 Jihad training camps, the same Taliban killing American soldiers today, and the same Taliban that seeks a global Islamic caliphate. Al-Sharif is the type of Jihadist that Bergen and Cruickshank think will make "America safer."
Such dangerously misleading information about the Jihad-supporting Al-Sharif has found its way into American government initiatives as well. On July 31st, the Washington Times published an article (ironically titled "War of Ideas") where it interviewed James K. Glassman, the new undersecretary of state for public diplomacy. Mr. Glassman was proud of his efforts within the government to promote Jihad-supporting Al-Sharif as an example of programs to "push back against violent extremist ideology." In the July 2008 issue of the West Point Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, counterterrorist Michael Jacobson also cited Al-Sharif to our fighting men and women as an individual who had written a book "rejecting al-Qa'ida's message and tactics." But while describing Al-Sharif's concerns about not wanting to harm "innocent people," Mr. Jacobson fails to mention in his West Point article that Al-Sharif calls for Jihad against our soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In their New Republic article, Bergen and Cruickshank also claim that the Muslim Brotherhood (whose motto is "Jihad is our way") is recruiting "moderates" at the British Finsbury mosque, based on reports of a power struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood's Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and Abu Hamza's former followers, according to "Kamal El Helbawy, spokesman for the new trustees at the mosque." Bergen and Cruickshank ignore reports of the MAB's links to the terrorist group Hamas. They don't mention reports of Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets near the MAB-run mosque. They don't mention reports of Somali Islamic supremacists meeting sympathizers at the MAB-run mosque. But most revealing is their blanket acceptance that the Muslim Brotherhood would be recruiting "moderates." This comes back to a history of Bergen and Cruickshank's accommodation and praise for the Muslim Brotherhood members, especially their contact Kamal el Helbawy – reportedly "the main Brotherhood man in Britain and Europe."
Two years ago, Bergen and Cruickshank were key members of an October 2006 New York University Center on Law and Security "Open Forum on the Muslim Brotherhood." One member of the forum that wasn't allowed into the United States was the Muslim Brotherhood's Kamal el Helbawy. (This is the same Kamal el Helbawy who advised Bergen and Cruickshank about the Finsbury mosque in their 2008 New Republic article.) Newsweek reported that Paul Cruickshank organized the October 2006 forum for this Muslim Brotherhood leader to speak in America. When Newsweek asked Mr. Cruickshank about why Kama el Helbawy wasn't allowed in the United States, Cruickshank was baffled, stating that "[h]e's a really respected guy... [h]e's very influential within the Muslim community in Britain and his name is recognized throughout the world." Helbawy told Newsweek that he had denounced terrorism "thousands of times."
But Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT) leader Steven Emerson provided a different perspective of Bergen and Cruickshank's Muslim Brotherhood contact Kamal el Helbawy. In October 2006, Steven Emerson wrote for the Counterterrorism Blog about his own experience seeing Helbawy supporting Hamas, supporting an Intifada against Israel, and verbally attacking Christians and Jews. Steven Emerson also pointed to Helbawy speaking at a conference that included "Blind Sheikh" Omar Abdul-Rahman, who is in prison for the 1993 World Trade Center attack. In retrospect, given Bergen and Cruickshank's call for engagement with individuals that would support Jihad in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel, their October 2006 defense of the Muslim Brotherhood's Helbawy is now hardly surprising.
Notably, two years after Paul Cruickshank's organization of this NYU conference for this Muslim Brotherhood pro-Jihadist who was forbidden from entering the country, Paul Cruickshank is now a contributing expert for the Counterterrorism Blog. Paul Cruickshank will be speaking at the September 23rd Counterterrorism Blog-sponsored event on Capitol Hill to promote appeasement towards Islamic supremacists as a counterterrorism tactic.
The New America Foundation, who is a co-sponsor of the September 23rd Capitol Hill panel on "The Jihadists' Revolt Against Al Qaeda," has also held their own conferences on Jihad. In February 2008, the New America Foundation sponsored a conference with non-interventionist Marc Sageman, author of "Leaderless Jihad," who is popular for his theory that Jihadists groups are merely "social movements" that kill simply for the "thrill." Sageman claims that we should not "make too much" out of Islamic supremacist ideologies. Sageman told the New America Foundation conference regarding Jihad that "it's more about hero worship than about religion." (See my March 17, 2008 article for more on Sageman and non-interventionists.)
Another notable New America Foundation conference addressing Jihad was held three years ago in Washington D.C. On September 5-6, 2005, the New America Foundation and the Democracy Coalition Project sponsored the "National Policy Forum on Terrorism, Security and America's Purpose."
In this New America Foundation conference's working papers (page 11), Peter Bergen advises that a key aspect in fighting terrorism is to:
"Engage Islamist parties: The long-term solution to the problem of Muslim terrorist groups is a more democratic Middle East of their creation, not ours, where there is real political space for Islamist parties. Islamists and Muslim fundamentalists are not our enemies and can even be our friends. A more democratic Middle East will initially see the strong emergence of Islamist parties because they are generally more organized and have more legitimacy than other groups."
This concept that "Islamists... are not our enemies and can even be our friends" goes to the root of the problem with those in the counterterrorism community who would appease Islamic supremacists. They view political "Islamism," not as the supremacist, anti-equality ideology that it is, but as just another flavor of democratic political thought, like libertarianism. From this point of denial, it is a short walk to thinking that Jihadists aren't our enemy either, just those Jihadists that support al Qaeda.
This slippery slope of denial on the threat of Islamic supremacism and Jihad takes us to increasing recommendations of "engagement" and "counter-radicalization" that represents the growing surrender to Islamic supremacism within the counterterrorism community today.
Accepting "Jihad is Our Way" in Counterterrorism Strategies
In addition to the Bergen/Cruickshank calls for engagement with Islamic supremacists, the June 2008 West Point Combating Terrorism Center's Sentinel published an article by Peter Mandaville titled "Engaging Islamists in the West" (page 5). In this West Point article, Peter Mandaville argues that Islamists should be a "component of counter-terrorism solutions," and calls for the American engagement with Islamists in counterterrorism efforts from among "groups affiliated with the broad and diverse Muslim Brotherhood movement." How "broad and diverse" is a movement whose motto is "Jihad is our way"? And how could any groups whose defined goals are Jihad be part of any counterterrorism strategy?
Yet who can be surprised at such reactions from some in the counterterrorism community, when presidential candidate Barack Obama views as a key foreign policy position that "what we also want to do is to shrink the pool of potential recruits… [a]nd that involves engaging the Islamic world rather than vilifying it," when America does not yet have either a defined enemy or a strategy in dealing with Islamic supremacism?
An additional influence on American counterterror analysts comes from those in the United Kingdom and Europe who have already lost the war of ideas against Islamic supremacism, and have adopted a "leave me alone" policy of "counter-radicalization." Not unlike the Bergen/Cruickshank recommendations, those who promote "counter-radicalization," like the British Home Office's RICU, seek to focus their energies on Al-Qaeda and "criminals," while tolerating those who call for Jihad in other countries. As described in my August 31, 2008 article, advocates of "counter-radicalization" argue that the West should "engage" with Islamists, "political salafists," the Muslim Brotherhood, and other groups, as a way to prevent Jihadist violence (that is - in their country only). Not surprisingly, this is a popular policy in the United Kingdom, which has sought to influence American counterterror analysts to adopt such a policy of surrender in the war of ideas against Islamic supremacism here in the United States as well.
Counterterrorism analyst Matthew Levitt states that "political salafists have credibility when it comes to deradicalizing others." Mr. Levitt praises the British approach, stating that the "British realize they may have significant differences with 'political salafists' who think 'resistance' in Palestine or Iraq is legitimate, but are thinking about ways that they can at least leverage them and their positions in an effort to de-radicalize the most severe extremists (taqfiris) randomly targeting civilians today." In short, this perspective believes that it is acceptable to work with those who support Jihad in other countries and to legitimize an ideology of Islamic supremacism, if it can temporarily prevent violence in your country. It is exactly this type of surrender to Islamic supremacism that led to the United Kingdom becoming a haven for Jihadists for decades and led to their present Jihad terror problem today. Another counterterrorism analyst Lorenzo Vidino praised Mr. Levitt's article regarding "political Salafists/non-violent Islamists," and further states that Europeans have no choice but to accept "some form of cooperation with political Salafists/non-violent Islamists." According to Mr. Vidino, what is important is to understand the "difference between engaging and empowering." Mr. Vidino thinks Europeans "get" this, but the truth is that giving legitimacy to an Islamic supremacist group by engaging them... is empowering them.
Paul Cruickshank, Michael Jacobson, Matthew Levitt, and Lorenzo Vidino are all contributing editors on the Counterterrorism Blog that is sponsoring the September 23rd panel featuring Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank's "Jihadists' Revolt Against Al Qaeda."
The counterterrorism movements supporting "engagement" with Islamic supremacism and the growing "counter-radicalization" policy influence from European "allies" (who have already surrendered to Islamic supremacism) shows how terribly misguided much of America's counterterrorism community has become today.
It would be comforting to know that there will be those who will successfully counter Bergen's and Cruickshank's arguments on the September 23rd Capitol Hill panel. However, another one of the panelists has told members of the counterterrorism community that "I won't hesitate in saying that I believe we must initiate some kind of dialogue with the [Muslim] [B]rotherhood, even if we don't support their overall agenda." Worst of all, such thinking is becoming increasingly common among some counterterror analysts. This summary of the challenges in the counterterrorism community is sadly only the tip of the iceberg.
The very idea that we should reject "dialogue" with Islamic supremacists for the simple reason that every "engagement" with them, effectively legitimizes their efforts in the eyes of many - is completely lost. Without a defined enemy and a strategy, counterterror analysts and "experts" on Islam have a continuing free-for-all debate on what America should do about Jihad. As shown in the previous paragraphs, this strategic vacuum has allowed Islamic supremacist groups and their advocates to influence a growing number of counterterrorism analysts. This has resulted in calls to embrace Islamic supremacists, Jihadists, and to merely fight a "war on extremists." This has effectively resulted in many American counterterror analysts' surrender in the war of ideas.
Which Side Will You Be On?
There any many ways to sugar-coat "surrender" in the war of ideas against Islamic supremacism. Legitimizing Islamic supremacist groups through "engagement" with them is and will be viewed worldwide as nothing less than such surrender. Tolerating those who are against al Qaeda, but who continue to promote Jihad against Americans and others – is also nothing less than surrender.
In the war of ideas, tacticians within some counterterrorism organizations such as Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank seek to promote nothing less than surrender to Islamic supremacist ideologues. They will call it something else, such as a "dialogue," a "truce" perhaps, or maybe "an understanding" (like the British "gentlemen's agreement" with Islamic supremacists for decades). They may state that tolerating Islamic supremacists is merely "respecting cultural diversity," or they may claim that it is part of a policy of "counter-radicalization." But their overall viewpoint on Islamic supremacism is clearly communicated in Bergen's and Cruickshank's statement: "If this is a war of ideas, it is their ideas, not the West's, that matter."
And that is surrender in the war of ideas.
In this war of ideas on Jihad and Islamic supremacism, there remain two major ideological groups.
-- The "Leave Me Alone" Group: There is the group led by a growing number of career counterterror analysts who seek to appease and engage with Islamic supremacists, in the misguided belief that by seeking to convince such supremacists not to pursue violent terrorism for a while, this will reduce the threat of Jihad. They also believe that by "regionalizing" the discussion of Jihad that they can tolerate those who support so-called "defensive Jihad" (in Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, etc.) if they are against Al-Qaeda.
-- The Anti-Jihad Group: The other group is the Anti-Jihad community that realizes any legitimacy given to Islamic supremacist organizations will only increase their stature, membership, and growing threat, and that regardless of Islamic supremacist organizations' momentary tactics, the ideology of Islamic supremacism remains the root cause of Jihad. They realize that any tactic that ends up giving legitimacy to Islamic supremacists will ultimately increase the threat of Jihad. This group also realizes that the ideas of "regionalizing" Jihad and accepting so-called "defensive Jihad" are misguided, as Jihad and Islamic supremacism remain transnational threats to all people and their hopes for equality and liberty.
Which side will you be on?
Not taking a side, not making a decision, is a decision as well. Those who don't make a decision will ultimately have someone else make it for them. With the growing surrender in our homeland security, in our military, in our law enforcement, and now, finally in our counterterrorism communities, remember that not making a decision may very well be equivalent to accepting surrender to Islamic supremacism.
The decisions we make now regarding the threat of Islamic supremacism (including not making decisions) will affect the lives, dreams, and hopes of Americans, of women, of children, and of countless others around the world. It is easier to do nothing, to say nothing. But it is right? Is it moral? Is it the American thing to do?
In the past year, the surrender in the war of ideas by increasing numbers of government officials and government organizations has been a great accomplishment for Islamic supremacists. Every time Americans don't stand up and speak out against those who offer terms of surrender, Islamic supremacists gain another victory in the war of ideas and their confidence and determination grows. Islamic supremacists view a tired and complacent America as a defeated America.
Are you ready to surrender to Islamic supremacists?
The silence of many of the 300 million American people has convinced a number of career counterterror analysts that you already have surrendered.
Prove them wrong.
Fear No Evil.
[Postscript - see also Sources documents for additional reading and background information.]
By Jeffrey Imm
In the "stealth Jihad" war of ideas over the past year, one American institution after another has signaled its willingness to surrender to the advocates of Islamic supremacism – our homeland security, our military, and our law enforcement. Islamic supremacist groups have "guided" such American government organizations to create a "terror lexicon" that excludes "Jihad," to promote "progress" over "liberty," to blackball those who would confront the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic supremacists, to "train" our law enforcement, and to openly promote engagement with Islamic supremacist organizations as part of counterterrorism tactics.
Six months ago, the growing surrender in the war of ideas by America's counterterrorism community was seen by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) memorandum endorsing the DHS "terror lexicon" prohibiting the use of the terms such as "Jihad," "Islamist," and "mujahedeen." This milestone was part of a trend that has been growing for nearly two years. Since the November 2006 mid-term elections resulting in a Democrat Congressional majority, a growing number in counterterrorist organizations have been moving towards promoting analysts that support negotiations, rather than confrontation, with Islamic supremacists. The belief among some is that, should the Democrat Party win the presidency, a new Democrat administration would seek such "engagement" policies. As the presidential campaign has heated up, this emphasis has accelerated in some counterterrorist organizations, which fear ending up on the outside looking in.
However, over the past seven years, a vacuum of strategic war planning on Islamic supremacism by the U.S. military, intelligence, and executive branch (seen in today's "war on extremism") has made America increasingly dependent on what little strategic thinking that has been available from the counterterrorism community. The growing surrender of counterterrorism groups to the policies of appeasement and "engagement," legitimizing Islamic supremacists, undermines one of the last remaining "strategic voices" on Jihad. Increasingly, the numbers are shrinking in counterterrorism communities who seek confrontation against Jihadists and Islamic supremacists; some voices are being marginalized and silenced. This growing surrender will require average American citizens to increase their activism in demanding that their government representatives confront Jihad and Islamic supremacism.
September 23rd will mark yet another milestone in the growing surrender of America's counterterrorism organizations, as Capitol Hill will be used to promote the ideas of those who think America should "engage" with Islamic supremacist groups.
Using Capitol Hill to Promote Appeasement of Jihad and Islamic Supremacism
One day after the seventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the Counterterrorism Blog announced a panel discussion to be held at 10 AM on Tuesday, September 23, 2008 at a U.S. Capitol building facility in Washington, D.C. (2255 Rayburn House Office Building). This discussion will provide a platform for Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank to promote their views that by engaging with Islamic supremacists and Jihadists, the West can dissuade them from pursuing al Qaeda-style terrorism.
Peter Bergen is associated with the New America Foundation and Paul Cruickshank is a contributing expert for the Counterterrorism Blog; both are also research fellows with the New York University's Center on Law and Security.
The September 23rd meeting entitled "The Jihadists' Revolt Against Al Qaeda" is being co-sponsored by the Counterterrorism Blog and by the New America Foundation (described by Washington Post writer David Ignatius in February as "a liberal think tank.") The meeting is to discuss Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank's New Republic (TNR) June 2008 article "The Unraveling," where they ostensibly argue that there is a "jihadist revolt against Bin Laden." This is the basis for their argument that engagement with Islamic supremacists and anti-al Qaeda Jihadists will make "America safer," and that in a war of ideas with Islamic supremacists, "it is their ideas, not the West's, that matter."
Per my July 16th response to their New Republic article, Bergen and Cruickshank use the example of Sayyid Imam Al Sharif's (aka "Dr. Fadl") rejection of al Qaeda as justification for such a policy. What they don't report is the rest of the story on Al-Sharif. In fact, Al-Sharif continues to support Jihad in Afghanistan and Iraq, where American soldiers are in harm's way, and Al-Sharif continues to support Jihad against Israel. Bergen and Cruickshank also don't report Al-Sharif's continued support for Islamic supremacism and the Taliban, where he states: "Jihad in Afghanistan will lead to the creation of an Islamic state with the triumph of the Taliban, God willing." Al-Sharif's support of Jihad is for the same Taliban that supported Bin Laden's 9/11 Jihad training camps, the same Taliban killing American soldiers today, and the same Taliban that seeks a global Islamic caliphate. Al-Sharif is the type of Jihadist that Bergen and Cruickshank think will make "America safer."
Such dangerously misleading information about the Jihad-supporting Al-Sharif has found its way into American government initiatives as well. On July 31st, the Washington Times published an article (ironically titled "War of Ideas") where it interviewed James K. Glassman, the new undersecretary of state for public diplomacy. Mr. Glassman was proud of his efforts within the government to promote Jihad-supporting Al-Sharif as an example of programs to "push back against violent extremist ideology." In the July 2008 issue of the West Point Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, counterterrorist Michael Jacobson also cited Al-Sharif to our fighting men and women as an individual who had written a book "rejecting al-Qa'ida's message and tactics." But while describing Al-Sharif's concerns about not wanting to harm "innocent people," Mr. Jacobson fails to mention in his West Point article that Al-Sharif calls for Jihad against our soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In their New Republic article, Bergen and Cruickshank also claim that the Muslim Brotherhood (whose motto is "Jihad is our way") is recruiting "moderates" at the British Finsbury mosque, based on reports of a power struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood's Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and Abu Hamza's former followers, according to "Kamal El Helbawy, spokesman for the new trustees at the mosque." Bergen and Cruickshank ignore reports of the MAB's links to the terrorist group Hamas. They don't mention reports of Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets near the MAB-run mosque. They don't mention reports of Somali Islamic supremacists meeting sympathizers at the MAB-run mosque. But most revealing is their blanket acceptance that the Muslim Brotherhood would be recruiting "moderates." This comes back to a history of Bergen and Cruickshank's accommodation and praise for the Muslim Brotherhood members, especially their contact Kamal el Helbawy – reportedly "the main Brotherhood man in Britain and Europe."
Two years ago, Bergen and Cruickshank were key members of an October 2006 New York University Center on Law and Security "Open Forum on the Muslim Brotherhood." One member of the forum that wasn't allowed into the United States was the Muslim Brotherhood's Kamal el Helbawy. (This is the same Kamal el Helbawy who advised Bergen and Cruickshank about the Finsbury mosque in their 2008 New Republic article.) Newsweek reported that Paul Cruickshank organized the October 2006 forum for this Muslim Brotherhood leader to speak in America. When Newsweek asked Mr. Cruickshank about why Kama el Helbawy wasn't allowed in the United States, Cruickshank was baffled, stating that "[h]e's a really respected guy... [h]e's very influential within the Muslim community in Britain and his name is recognized throughout the world." Helbawy told Newsweek that he had denounced terrorism "thousands of times."
But Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT) leader Steven Emerson provided a different perspective of Bergen and Cruickshank's Muslim Brotherhood contact Kamal el Helbawy. In October 2006, Steven Emerson wrote for the Counterterrorism Blog about his own experience seeing Helbawy supporting Hamas, supporting an Intifada against Israel, and verbally attacking Christians and Jews. Steven Emerson also pointed to Helbawy speaking at a conference that included "Blind Sheikh" Omar Abdul-Rahman, who is in prison for the 1993 World Trade Center attack. In retrospect, given Bergen and Cruickshank's call for engagement with individuals that would support Jihad in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel, their October 2006 defense of the Muslim Brotherhood's Helbawy is now hardly surprising.
Notably, two years after Paul Cruickshank's organization of this NYU conference for this Muslim Brotherhood pro-Jihadist who was forbidden from entering the country, Paul Cruickshank is now a contributing expert for the Counterterrorism Blog. Paul Cruickshank will be speaking at the September 23rd Counterterrorism Blog-sponsored event on Capitol Hill to promote appeasement towards Islamic supremacists as a counterterrorism tactic.
The New America Foundation, who is a co-sponsor of the September 23rd Capitol Hill panel on "The Jihadists' Revolt Against Al Qaeda," has also held their own conferences on Jihad. In February 2008, the New America Foundation sponsored a conference with non-interventionist Marc Sageman, author of "Leaderless Jihad," who is popular for his theory that Jihadists groups are merely "social movements" that kill simply for the "thrill." Sageman claims that we should not "make too much" out of Islamic supremacist ideologies. Sageman told the New America Foundation conference regarding Jihad that "it's more about hero worship than about religion." (See my March 17, 2008 article for more on Sageman and non-interventionists.)
Another notable New America Foundation conference addressing Jihad was held three years ago in Washington D.C. On September 5-6, 2005, the New America Foundation and the Democracy Coalition Project sponsored the "National Policy Forum on Terrorism, Security and America's Purpose."
In this New America Foundation conference's working papers (page 11), Peter Bergen advises that a key aspect in fighting terrorism is to:
"Engage Islamist parties: The long-term solution to the problem of Muslim terrorist groups is a more democratic Middle East of their creation, not ours, where there is real political space for Islamist parties. Islamists and Muslim fundamentalists are not our enemies and can even be our friends. A more democratic Middle East will initially see the strong emergence of Islamist parties because they are generally more organized and have more legitimacy than other groups."
This concept that "Islamists... are not our enemies and can even be our friends" goes to the root of the problem with those in the counterterrorism community who would appease Islamic supremacists. They view political "Islamism," not as the supremacist, anti-equality ideology that it is, but as just another flavor of democratic political thought, like libertarianism. From this point of denial, it is a short walk to thinking that Jihadists aren't our enemy either, just those Jihadists that support al Qaeda.
This slippery slope of denial on the threat of Islamic supremacism and Jihad takes us to increasing recommendations of "engagement" and "counter-radicalization" that represents the growing surrender to Islamic supremacism within the counterterrorism community today.
Accepting "Jihad is Our Way" in Counterterrorism Strategies
In addition to the Bergen/Cruickshank calls for engagement with Islamic supremacists, the June 2008 West Point Combating Terrorism Center's Sentinel published an article by Peter Mandaville titled "Engaging Islamists in the West" (page 5). In this West Point article, Peter Mandaville argues that Islamists should be a "component of counter-terrorism solutions," and calls for the American engagement with Islamists in counterterrorism efforts from among "groups affiliated with the broad and diverse Muslim Brotherhood movement." How "broad and diverse" is a movement whose motto is "Jihad is our way"? And how could any groups whose defined goals are Jihad be part of any counterterrorism strategy?
Yet who can be surprised at such reactions from some in the counterterrorism community, when presidential candidate Barack Obama views as a key foreign policy position that "what we also want to do is to shrink the pool of potential recruits… [a]nd that involves engaging the Islamic world rather than vilifying it," when America does not yet have either a defined enemy or a strategy in dealing with Islamic supremacism?
An additional influence on American counterterror analysts comes from those in the United Kingdom and Europe who have already lost the war of ideas against Islamic supremacism, and have adopted a "leave me alone" policy of "counter-radicalization." Not unlike the Bergen/Cruickshank recommendations, those who promote "counter-radicalization," like the British Home Office's RICU, seek to focus their energies on Al-Qaeda and "criminals," while tolerating those who call for Jihad in other countries. As described in my August 31, 2008 article, advocates of "counter-radicalization" argue that the West should "engage" with Islamists, "political salafists," the Muslim Brotherhood, and other groups, as a way to prevent Jihadist violence (that is - in their country only). Not surprisingly, this is a popular policy in the United Kingdom, which has sought to influence American counterterror analysts to adopt such a policy of surrender in the war of ideas against Islamic supremacism here in the United States as well.
Counterterrorism analyst Matthew Levitt states that "political salafists have credibility when it comes to deradicalizing others." Mr. Levitt praises the British approach, stating that the "British realize they may have significant differences with 'political salafists' who think 'resistance' in Palestine or Iraq is legitimate, but are thinking about ways that they can at least leverage them and their positions in an effort to de-radicalize the most severe extremists (taqfiris) randomly targeting civilians today." In short, this perspective believes that it is acceptable to work with those who support Jihad in other countries and to legitimize an ideology of Islamic supremacism, if it can temporarily prevent violence in your country. It is exactly this type of surrender to Islamic supremacism that led to the United Kingdom becoming a haven for Jihadists for decades and led to their present Jihad terror problem today. Another counterterrorism analyst Lorenzo Vidino praised Mr. Levitt's article regarding "political Salafists/non-violent Islamists," and further states that Europeans have no choice but to accept "some form of cooperation with political Salafists/non-violent Islamists." According to Mr. Vidino, what is important is to understand the "difference between engaging and empowering." Mr. Vidino thinks Europeans "get" this, but the truth is that giving legitimacy to an Islamic supremacist group by engaging them... is empowering them.
Paul Cruickshank, Michael Jacobson, Matthew Levitt, and Lorenzo Vidino are all contributing editors on the Counterterrorism Blog that is sponsoring the September 23rd panel featuring Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank's "Jihadists' Revolt Against Al Qaeda."
The counterterrorism movements supporting "engagement" with Islamic supremacism and the growing "counter-radicalization" policy influence from European "allies" (who have already surrendered to Islamic supremacism) shows how terribly misguided much of America's counterterrorism community has become today.
It would be comforting to know that there will be those who will successfully counter Bergen's and Cruickshank's arguments on the September 23rd Capitol Hill panel. However, another one of the panelists has told members of the counterterrorism community that "I won't hesitate in saying that I believe we must initiate some kind of dialogue with the [Muslim] [B]rotherhood, even if we don't support their overall agenda." Worst of all, such thinking is becoming increasingly common among some counterterror analysts. This summary of the challenges in the counterterrorism community is sadly only the tip of the iceberg.
The very idea that we should reject "dialogue" with Islamic supremacists for the simple reason that every "engagement" with them, effectively legitimizes their efforts in the eyes of many - is completely lost. Without a defined enemy and a strategy, counterterror analysts and "experts" on Islam have a continuing free-for-all debate on what America should do about Jihad. As shown in the previous paragraphs, this strategic vacuum has allowed Islamic supremacist groups and their advocates to influence a growing number of counterterrorism analysts. This has resulted in calls to embrace Islamic supremacists, Jihadists, and to merely fight a "war on extremists." This has effectively resulted in many American counterterror analysts' surrender in the war of ideas.
Which Side Will You Be On?
There any many ways to sugar-coat "surrender" in the war of ideas against Islamic supremacism. Legitimizing Islamic supremacist groups through "engagement" with them is and will be viewed worldwide as nothing less than such surrender. Tolerating those who are against al Qaeda, but who continue to promote Jihad against Americans and others – is also nothing less than surrender.
In the war of ideas, tacticians within some counterterrorism organizations such as Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank seek to promote nothing less than surrender to Islamic supremacist ideologues. They will call it something else, such as a "dialogue," a "truce" perhaps, or maybe "an understanding" (like the British "gentlemen's agreement" with Islamic supremacists for decades). They may state that tolerating Islamic supremacists is merely "respecting cultural diversity," or they may claim that it is part of a policy of "counter-radicalization." But their overall viewpoint on Islamic supremacism is clearly communicated in Bergen's and Cruickshank's statement: "If this is a war of ideas, it is their ideas, not the West's, that matter."
And that is surrender in the war of ideas.
In this war of ideas on Jihad and Islamic supremacism, there remain two major ideological groups.
-- The "Leave Me Alone" Group: There is the group led by a growing number of career counterterror analysts who seek to appease and engage with Islamic supremacists, in the misguided belief that by seeking to convince such supremacists not to pursue violent terrorism for a while, this will reduce the threat of Jihad. They also believe that by "regionalizing" the discussion of Jihad that they can tolerate those who support so-called "defensive Jihad" (in Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, etc.) if they are against Al-Qaeda.
-- The Anti-Jihad Group: The other group is the Anti-Jihad community that realizes any legitimacy given to Islamic supremacist organizations will only increase their stature, membership, and growing threat, and that regardless of Islamic supremacist organizations' momentary tactics, the ideology of Islamic supremacism remains the root cause of Jihad. They realize that any tactic that ends up giving legitimacy to Islamic supremacists will ultimately increase the threat of Jihad. This group also realizes that the ideas of "regionalizing" Jihad and accepting so-called "defensive Jihad" are misguided, as Jihad and Islamic supremacism remain transnational threats to all people and their hopes for equality and liberty.
Which side will you be on?
Not taking a side, not making a decision, is a decision as well. Those who don't make a decision will ultimately have someone else make it for them. With the growing surrender in our homeland security, in our military, in our law enforcement, and now, finally in our counterterrorism communities, remember that not making a decision may very well be equivalent to accepting surrender to Islamic supremacism.
The decisions we make now regarding the threat of Islamic supremacism (including not making decisions) will affect the lives, dreams, and hopes of Americans, of women, of children, and of countless others around the world. It is easier to do nothing, to say nothing. But it is right? Is it moral? Is it the American thing to do?
In the past year, the surrender in the war of ideas by increasing numbers of government officials and government organizations has been a great accomplishment for Islamic supremacists. Every time Americans don't stand up and speak out against those who offer terms of surrender, Islamic supremacists gain another victory in the war of ideas and their confidence and determination grows. Islamic supremacists view a tired and complacent America as a defeated America.
Are you ready to surrender to Islamic supremacists?
The silence of many of the 300 million American people has convinced a number of career counterterror analysts that you already have surrendered.
Prove them wrong.
Fear No Evil.
[Postscript - see also Sources documents for additional reading and background information.]
Think about this! It could happen!!!
Much is made of McCain's age.
Has anyone brought up the fact that Obama smokes and both of his parents died at an early age. Plus Biden has had two brain aneurysms which could have killed him.
If they both died while in office; that would leave Nancy Pelosi as president.
Spies Warn That Al Qaeda Aims for October Surprise
By ELI LAKE,
WASHINGTON — In the aftermath of two major terrorist attacks on Western targets, America's counterterrorism community is warning that Al Qaeda may launch more overseas operations to influence the presidential elections in November.
WASHINGTON — In the aftermath of two major terrorist attacks on Western targets, America's counterterrorism community is warning that Al Qaeda may launch more overseas operations to influence the presidential elections in November.
Call it Osama bin Laden's "October surprise." In late August, during the weekend between the Democratic and Republican conventions, America's military and intelligence agencies intercepted a series of messages from Al Qaeda's leadership to intermediate members of the organization asking local cells to be prepared for imminent instructions.
An official familiar with the new intelligence said the message was picked up in multiple settings, from couriers to encrypted electronic communications to other means. "These are generic orders," the source said — a distinction from the more specific intelligence about the location, time, and method of an attack. "It was, 'Be on notice. We may call upon you soon.' It was sent out on many channels."
Also, Yemen's national English-language newspaper is reporting that a spokesman for Yemen's Islamic Jihad, the Qaeda affiliate that claimed credit for last week's American embassy bombing in Sa'naa, is now publicly threatening to attack foreigners and high government officials if American and British diplomats do not leave the country.
Mr. bin Laden has sought to influence democratic elections in the past. On March 11, 2004, Al Qaeda carried out a series of bombings on Madrid commuter trains. Three days later, the opposition and anti-Iraq war Socialist Workers Party was voted into power.
In the week before the 2004 American presidential election, Mr. bin Laden recorded a video message to the American people promising repercussions if President Bush were re-elected. In later messages, Al Qaeda's leader claimed credit for helping elect Mr. Bush in 2004. Last year in Pakistan, Qaeda assassins claimed the life of Benazir Bhutto, a former prime minister who returned to her native country in a bid for re-election.
"There is an expectation that Al Qaeda will try to influence the November elections by attempting attacks globally," a former Bush and Clinton White House counterterrorism official, Roger Cressey, said yesterday.
Mr. Cressey said Al Qaeda lacks the capability to pull off an attack in the continental United States, however. "It would likely be a higher Al Qaeda tempo of attacks against U.S. and allied targets abroad," he said.
At a talk at the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs on August 12, the national intelligence officer for transnational threats said he expected to see more threat reporting on Al Qaeda as America approaches the November elections.
The terrorist attack on the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad on Saturday was a particular blow to the allied effort against Al Qaeda. The hotel's lobby in recent years served as a meeting place for the CIA and Pakistanis who would not risk being seen at the American Embassy. The bombing, which targeted one of the most heavily fortified locations in Pakistan's capital, will likely claim close to 100 lives after the dead are pulled from the rubble.
President Zardari, who had just given his first major address as Pakistan's head of state, on fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda, was the target of Saturday's attack, the vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, said.
"He was expected to attend the iftar dinner at the Marriott," Mr. Gartenstein-Ross said "Think of the symbolic value if they were able to kill Zardari after his first address as president of Pakistan in a speech announcing his fight against the terrorists. The symbolic effect of the attack on the same day would be devastating."
An adviser to Senator McCain and a former director of central intelligence under President Clinton, James Woolsey, said Al Qaeda has a "history of doing three things at least related to elections. One is to attack before elections, such as in 2004 in Spain, and of course the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. They also have a history of attacks when new leaders take over, like Gordon Brown in Britain and the new leader in Pakistan, with the attack over the weekend. Also Al Qaeda sends messages to populations in elections. You really don't know which one of these they are going to implement."
Earlier this summer, another McCain campaign official mused in an interview that an attack could benefit his candidate in the polls. But whether that statement is true is unclear: At the Republican National Convention this month, Mr. McCain praised the president's counterterrorism policies for preventing an attack in America since September 11, 2001. The Bush administration has deliberately refrained from pointing to this success in light of the many plots that the president has said have been aborted on American soil since September 11.
The deputy communications director for the McCain campaign, Michael Goldfarb, said: "There is no doubt that Al Qaeda is still dangerous and still desires to strike at America and our allies. But Americans will not be intimidated and their votes will not be swayed by terror."
A spokeswoman for the Obama campaign, Wendy Morigi, said, "Last week's attacks demonstrate the grave and urgent threat that Al Qaeda and its affiliates pose to the United States and the security of all nations. As Senator Obama has said for some time, we must refocus our efforts on defeating Al Qaeda around the world."
A Disability Epidemic Among a Railroad’s Retirees
.... Virtually every career employee — as many as 97 percent in one recent year — applies for and gets disability payments soon after retirement, a computer analysis of federal records by The New York Times has found. Since 2000, those records show, about a quarter of a billion dollars in federal disability money has gone to former L.I.R.R. employees, including about 2,000 who retired during that time. ....
Foreign banks may get help
In a change from the original proposal sent to Capitol Hill, foreign-based banks with big U.S. operations could qualify for the Treasury Department’s mortgage bailout, according to the fine print of an administration statement Saturday night.
The theory, according to a participant in the negotiations, is that if the goal is to solve a liquidity crisis, it makes no sense to exclude banks that do a lot of lending in the United States.
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson confirmed the change on ABC's "This Week," telling George Stephanopoulos that coverage of foreign-based banks is "a distinction without a difference to the American people."
"If a financial institution has business operations in the United States, hires people in the United States, if they are clogged with illiquid assets, they have the same impact on the American people as any other institution," Paulson said.
"That's a distinction without a difference to the American people. The key here is protecting the system. ... We have a global financial system, and we are talking very aggressively with other countries around the world and encouraging them to do similar things, and I believe a number of them will. But, remember, this is about protecting the American people and protecting the taxpayers. and the American people don't care who owns the financial institution. If the financial institution in this country has problems, it'll have the same impact whether it's the U.S. or foreign." ....Click here for additional information
EXECS CRASH & EARN
Top executives at Lehman Brothers' New York office, who were at the helm during history's largest corporate bankruptcy, have been guaranteed the lion's share of a $2.5 billion bonus pot.
Lehman had "walled off" the fund, telling buyer Barclays Capital that it couldn't use the money for anything but severance payments or bonuses.
In bankruptcy court, British-based Barclays said it will use the cash to retain Lehman's most valued employees - particularly eight key directors.
Those "elite eight" also have been guaranteed $10 million to $25 million salaries for two years.
The most wanted include longtime execs Michael Gelband, the bank's global head of Capital Markets since June, and Eric Felder and Hyung Soon Lee, global co-heads of Fixed Income, positions both men were promoted to this month, the Sunday Times of London reported.
Gelband lives in tony Short Hills, NJ. Felder lives in a plush West Village pad and owns two Ferraris and a Land Rover, Department of Motor Vehicles records show.
The platinum payout will go to executives who rode the collapse of the nation's fourth-largest investment bank. In the past year, the company's stock price dropped from $68 a share to as low as 21 cents, and since June 2007, the bank has laid off 6,000 workers.
A Lehman spokeswoman denied that all the bonus cash would go to a few execs. ....
Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks
Weeks before bombs started falling on Georgia, a security researcher in suburban Massachusetts was watching an attack against the country in cyberspace.
Jose Nazario of Arbor Networks in Lexington noticed a stream of data directed at Georgian government sites containing the message: “win+love+in+Rusia.”
Other Internet experts in the United States said the attacks against Georgia’s Internet infrastructure began as early as July 20, with coordinated barrages of millions of requests — known as distributed denial of service, or D.D.O.S., attacks — that overloaded and effectively shut down Georgian servers.
Researchers at Shadowserver, a volunteer group that tracks malicious network activity, reported that the Web site of the Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, had been rendered inoperable for 24 hours by multiple D.D.O.S. attacks. They said the command and control server that directed the attack was based in the United States and had come online several weeks before it began the assault.
As it turns out, the July attack may have been a dress rehearsal for an all-out cyberwar once the shooting started between Georgia and Russia. According to Internet technical experts, it was the first time a known cyberattack had coincided with a shooting war. ....
Diseases pose big danger to biosecurity
FORGET letters laced with anthrax spores and subway gas attacks: the most serious biosecurity threat to Australia comes from economically devastating diseases such as foot and mouth disease and Nipah virus, as well as complacency about diseases such as bird flu. ....
Implications of the Financial Crisis
by Sam Rosenfeld
The financial crisis continues to spread, within the past two weeks, we have seen the fall of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and AIG in the US alone. (In the United Kingdom HBOS has fallen, with others on rocky ground, and in Australia Macquarie Bank is likewise at risk.)
These are fiscal events, and many in the security and law enforcement arenas (for the two are different, despite the perceptions of many that expertise in one translates to expertise in the other) are thinking about their own personal finances, but not about the implications for their operations.
A series of events now have higher likelihoods, while others remain remote at this time. The two events I am most concerned about are a disgruntled, laid off worker “going postal”, and large protests turning violent. Both incidents have critical implications for the company and community where they take place. I visited a major software company recently and was appalled at the lack of understanding, and the lack of co-operation with their local law enforcement about the common processes and procedures necessary for dealing with such a threat.
Companies must be paying very close attention to their security in times of unrest. There is a duty to care for all, even those being laid off, and measures must be put in place to protect the employees. As horrible as it sounds, an enforced no weapons policy now may prevent a much more negative public event later.
There are precedents globally for financial turmoil leading to public order events; one of the most immediately relevant is the poll tax riots (31 Mar 1990) in the United Kingdom. It was not the disenfranchised, the ‘weird and marginalised’ who were on the streets in protest, but the working and middle classes who were financially threatened and feared that their voices were not being heard. What started as a demonstration became a riot largely because the violence was instigated by Class War (an Anarchist group) and some members of Militant (extreme left wingers, originally part of the Labour Party). The policing response was harsh, broad and indiscriminate, and managed to turn a peaceful protest with small violent groups into widespread violence. The policing response very much resembled what was seen in St. Paul and Denver during the conventions, and there are serious lessons that must be learned for the future.
Given the state of the markets today and concern about 401ks and future livelihoods, such events are no longer inconceivable. Although such events are probably some time off, and will be rare, a police department’s inability to deal with an event in a manner that respects the members of the population, while effectively policing them, will have terrible consequences. To be frank, the inappropriate uses of force and mass arrests that were common in St. Paul against “fringe elements,” will not be so easily dismissed when it is members of the middle class. Police departments would be well advised to revise their public order plans and capabilities now.
The Muslim Students Association and the Jihad Network
The Muslim Students Association maintains hundreds of chapters across the country. Claiming to be just another religious or cultural organization protected by the university’s commitment to multiculturalism and “diversity,” the MSA is in reality part of a network established decades ago by the Muslim Brotherhood (godfather organization to Hamas and al Qaeda) to undermine America from within.
The Terrorism Awareness Project has released a video regarding the activities and behaviors of the Muslim Students Association, including information about the inflammatory anti American and anti Semitic speakers, often subsidized by student government funds, who are hosted by the Muslim Students Association chapters. This fall students on more than 100 campuses will hold events under the banner of "Stop the Jihad on Campus" designed to make the university community aware of the support provided for the jihadists' agendas.
Philippines: RP Marines rescue kidnapped children from al-Qaeda group
A reminder that "al-Qaeda groups" will go to any lengths, no matter how despicable, to seize power: "RP Marines rescue 2 children seized by Muslim militants," from GMA News, September 21:
MANILA, Philippines - A Philippine military official says marines safely rescued after a brief gunbattle two children who were kidnapped last week by Muslim militants linked to the al-Qaida-linked Abu Sayyaf group in the southern.Marines captured two alleged kidnappers during Sunday's pre-dawn rescue of the two boys in a remote village in mountainous Patikul township on southern Jolo island. Navy spokesman Lt. Col. Edgard Arevalo says the alleged kidnap leader, Hajal Hatae, a former Abu Sayyaf member, managed to escape and is being hunted by marines.
The Abu Sayyaf, believed to have more than 300 gunmen, has been battered by U.S.-backed Philippine military offensives in Jolo and nearby islands and has resorted to kidnappings for ransom and extortion to survive. - AP
The coming 1-world currency
..... On Wednesday, finance chiefs of five of the six-member, oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council approved a proposal to create a monetary union as a move toward adopting a single currency, according to the AFP.
The six Islamic states constituting the Gulf Cooperation Council are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Oman pulled out of the agreement last year.
Five states in the compact have agreed to set 2010 as the target date for the creation of a monetary union and the adoption of common currency.
The emergence of an Islamic single currency among these oil-rich Middle Eastern countries marks a significant step in the emerging worldwide movement to abandon national currencies in favor of regional currencies, along the model where the EU states have abandoned their national currencies in favor of the European Central Bank and the euro.
In 2002, the finance ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council states sought out the assistance of the European Central Bank, as the model for their single currency, according to BBC reports.
The council was created in 1981 to promote the development of the member countries.
The monetary union will entail the creation of a central bank to issue the single currency.
At the Wednesday meeting in the Saudi Red Sea city of Jeddah, the finance and economy ministers reviewed the European Union's response to the council's view on eliminating obstacles that have blocked a long-stalled free trade agreement with the EU.
Progress was also made on key convergence factors required to underpin the common currency, including setting the ratio of budget deficit and public debt to the gross domestic product, target interest rates and reserve requirements. Progress yet remains in reaching a consensus on inflation, the last remaining stumbling block to creating the common currency.
International Monetary Fund Chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn, who met with the Gulf Cooperation Council finance ministers in Jeddah, hailed the move by the Gulf states toward economic integration, though he continued to express doubts the single currency would be adopted within two years.
"Achieving monetary union by 2010 will be a major challenge, as much remains to be done to enable the creation of a single currency within two years," Straus-Kahn. "Overcoming the current inflationary pressures, developing a clear vision of the powers of the future common central bank, choosing an exchange regime of the common currency, and harmonizing financial regulations and structures will be critical in this process."
One factor easing the transition toward a single currency is that the six Gulf Cooperation Council member states all currently peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar.
For more on how globalists are pushing regional currencies toward a one-world currency, read Jerome Corsi's Red Alert, the premium, online intelligence news source by the WND staff writer, columnist and author of the New York Times No. 1 best-seller, "The Obama Nation."
Russians moving into Syria
Strategic alliance include fleet, missiles
Just as Russia has reasserted its power in the Black Sea, it now plans to make waves in the Mediterranean Sea by establishing a major base in Syria, according to a report from Joseph Farah's G2 Bulletin.
This decision not only will allow a permanent presence of Russia's nuclear-armed Black Sea fleet in the Mediterranean, but it also offers the potential for future confrontations between Russia and Israel, as well as with the United States.
The Russian navy has begun to upgrade facilities in Tartus, Syria, and already has backed this up by moving to Syria a flotilla of its powerful warships led by the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. The flotilla includes the Russian navy's biggest missile cruiser Moskva and some four nuclear missile submarines. ....
Islamabad Bomb's Secret Ingredient
The terrorist attack on the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, Pakistan caused massive destruction and loss of life. One of the reasons why: The bomb contained a lethal accelerant, found in some of the world's most powerful munitions. The BBC coverage of the bombing notes: ....
The Mansourian Candidate
(Compiler's note: Here we are a little less than two months away from the election and we still have not received an original copy of Obama's birth certificate. (We do have a forged one) We can't get his college transcripts, we can't tell where he received all of his money to go to college and he won't, doesn't want to even talk about it. And our press is giving him a free ride by not bringing any of this up on TV interviews. His book is full of lies but they are letting all that slide too. Yet they continue to pick on the Female candidate for VP, asking what her credentials are, and will she be able to do the job and have children (I think Obama has a couple of girls) have you ever heard the press ask him how he can be the President with a family. MEDIAGATE is really hijacking this election and we have nothing to say about it. Body count. In the last six months 292 killed (murdered) in Chicago, 221 killed in Iraq.
Sens. Barack Obama & Dick Durbin, Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr., Gov. Rod Blogojevich, House leader Mike Madigan, Atty. Gen. Lisa Madigan, Mayor Richard Daley.....our leadership in Illinois.....all Democrats. Thank you for the combat zone in Chicago. Of course they're all blaming each other. Can't blame Republicans, they're aren't any!
State pension fund $44 Billion in debt, worst in country. Cook County (Chicago) sales tax 10.25% highest in country. (Look'em up if you want). Chicago school system one of the worst in country. This is the political culture that Obama comes from in Illinois. And he's gonna "fix" Washington politics? This is a must read and consider series of articles.)
By Jack Cashill
Click here and here and here and here for additional insight
Sens. Barack Obama & Dick Durbin, Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr., Gov. Rod Blogojevich, House leader Mike Madigan, Atty. Gen. Lisa Madigan, Mayor Richard Daley.....our leadership in Illinois.....all Democrats. Thank you for the combat zone in Chicago. Of course they're all blaming each other. Can't blame Republicans, they're aren't any!
State pension fund $44 Billion in debt, worst in country. Cook County (Chicago) sales tax 10.25% highest in country. (Look'em up if you want). Chicago school system one of the worst in country. This is the political culture that Obama comes from in Illinois. And he's gonna "fix" Washington politics? This is a must read and consider series of articles.)
By Jack Cashill
Having written a book on intellectual fraud, Hoodwinked, and being something of a literary detective, I had no doubt on reading Barack Obama’s 1995 memoir, Dreams From My Father, that Obama did not really write it.
The style is above his pay grade, way above.
As Obama tells the story of the book’s genesis, “a few publishers called” after he had been elected president of the Harvard Law Review in 1990.
In the real world, publishers don’t call unknowns unless someone influential prompts them. Obama does not tell us who.
Nor does Obama tell the reader how he got elected president of the Review in the first place. Historically, the position had gone to students whose writings in the Review had shown real skill.
Prior to his election, however, Obama had written only one unsigned note and that one heavily edited. Once elected, Obama contributed not a word.
As Matthew Franck has pointed out in National Review Online, “A search of the HeinOnline database of law journals turns up exactly nothing credited to Obama in any law review anywhere at any time.” ....
Click here and here and here and here for additional insight
What's in a Name? 'Jihad' vs. 'Hiraba'
(Compiler's note: Clearly another "must read" article. rca)
by Patrick Poole
by Patrick Poole
What's in a name? When it comes to identifying what we are fighting against in the war for our civilization, quite a lot. Members of a movement among military and intellectual circles want to avoid asserting that we are fighting against "jihad" because that term is loaded with religious significance in Islam, replacing it with "hiraba", to highlight the criminal nature of Islamic terrorists:
Walid Phares, writing in American Thinker several weeks ago, challenged these advocates. As Phares noted in his article, Preventing the West from Understanding Jihad:
The good holy war is when the right religious and political authorities declare it against the correct enemy and at the right time. The bad jihad, called also Hiraba, is the wrong war, declared by bad (and irresponsible) people against the wrong enemy (for the moment), and without an appropriate authorization by the "real" Muslim leadership. According to this thesis, those Muslims who wage a Hiraba, a wrong war, are called Mufsidoon, from the Arabic word for "spoilers." The advocates of this ruse recommend that the United States and its allies stop calling the jihadists by that name and identifying the concept of Jihadism as the problem. In short, they argue that "jihad is good, but the Mufsidoon, the bad guys and the terrorists, spoiled the original legitimate sense."
The foremost advocate for this approach has been Jim Guirard of the Truespeak Institute, who has published a series of articles in recent years recommending this shift, citing a number of Muslim scholars in support. But a review of the scholars Guirard cites in support of his new lexicon finds that vast majority are American Muslims. There is no indication that this new linguistic initiative has any actual support from scholars in the Muslim world.
Additionally, as Pentagon Joint Staff analyst Stephen Coughlin recently observed in a unclassified memo (his analysis reprinted by Doug Farah) with reference to the "Truespeak" movement, many of these Muslim scholars cited by Guirard are affiliated with known Muslim Brotherhood front groups in the US -- groups that are advancing the very extremist views that Guirard intends this new lexicon to defeat.
And Coughlin is not the only military analyst to raise serious questions about the jihad-hiraba exchange. William McCants of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point notes several reasons why caution must be used with this approach.
But a more fundamental question has to be raised as to whether Guirard and others recommending this linguistic substitution have carefully read and understood the original sources upon which they have relied.
The earliest proponent of this new Islamic lexicon that I have been able to locate was University of Michigan professor Sherman Jackson, whose article "Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition" (Muslim World 91, 3/4 [Fall 2001], pp. 293-310) advocates this new terminology of hiraba, rather than jihad. This article is based on a series of lectures Jackson delivered prior to the 9/11 attacks, so his argument is not colored by those events. Many of the articles on this topic published since 9/11 refer back to Jackson's 2001 treatment of the subject, and Guirard specifically cites Jackson in support of his "truespeak".
However, one problem immediately appears when trying to use this analysis: it is confined to "domestic terrorism". In his first endnote, he explains the difficulty from the viewpoint of Islamic law to apply the argument to international terrorism:
I limit my discussion in this paper to domestic terrorism because a discussion of international terrorism would take us into the complicated issue of extraterritoriality and the question of the applicability of Islamic law outside the lands of Islam, an issue on which the jurists differed widely. (p. 306)
Thus, while Jackson's new lexicon might apply to "sudden jihad syndrome" of Muslims living in the West committing spontaneous, limited and "leaderless" acts of terror, applying the label of hiraba to international terrorist activities becomes problematic from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence. But since Guirard and others are trying to use this terminology with reference to international terror, it is worth hearing Jackson out to see how the exchange of hiraba for jihad is not supported by Islamic law itself.
Secondly, while Jackson states that hiraba fits nicely with the FBI's definition of terrorism, he then issues three qualifications that severely negate its use with reference to al-Qaeda, et al. (I have preserved his alternative spelling, "hirabah"):
Close examination of the classical Islamic law of hirabah, however, reveals that this law corresponds in its most salient features to domestic terrorism in the American legal system. This holds despite a number of important differences between hirabah and domestic terrorism. First, the importance of the political motivations of would-be terrorists appears to be inversely proportional in the two systems. Whereas the pursuit of political aims tends to heighten or perhaps establish the correspondence between publicly directed violence and terrorism in American law, in Islamic law it tends to have the opposite effect. In other words, to the extent that a group declares itself or is deemed by the government to be acting in pursuit of political objectives (and the assumption here is that these are grounded in some interpretation of religion), their activity is actually less likely to fall under the law of hirabah. Second, the importance attached to numbers appears to be inversely proportional in the two systems. Under Islamic law, the greater the number of individuals involved in a prima facie act of terrorism, the less likely to fall under the laws of hirabah. By comparison, according to FBI guidelines issued in 1983, a terrorism investigation may not even be initiated unless circumstances indicate that two or more persons are involved in an offense. Third, hirabah, at least in its fully developed form, appears to be potentially a much broader category than terrorism proper, covering as it does a spectrum of crimes ranging from breaking and entering to "hate crimes" to rape to terrorism proper. (pp. 293-294, emphasis added)
So, two paragraphs into Jackson's treatment of hiraba, and we face three seemingly insurmountable hurdles in applying the term to international terrorism on the basis of Islamic law:
- 1) If a group has legitimate (in the eyes of Islam) political aims, such as al-Qaeda's call to reestablish to global Islamic caliphate or groups like the Muslim Brotherhood trying to overthrow secular Arab leaders to reinstitute shari'a or inflict a "civilization-jihadist process" to undermine the West for establishing Islamic governments, the use of hiraba for terrorism is not warranted;
- 2) The more members a group has, such as al-Qaeda's international network of thousands of individuals or the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in more than 70 countries, the more legitimate their claims become and the application of hiraba for their actions does not hold;
- 3) Hiraba is a malleable category in which Jackson is trying to make terrorism fit. But the scholarly interpretations that he relies upon nowhere seem to contemplate the equation of hiraba for terrorism in its contemporary understanding.
These first two points of qualification especially seem to eliminate the possibility of any use of hiraba instead of jihad or terrorism with reference to acts of terror by international organizations.
But further into Jackson's analysis we find that the use of hiraba with reference to even domestic terrorism becomes problematic:
There were essentially two major considerations on the basis of which an act of hirabah was to be distinguished from an act of baghy, or rebellion....
The first of these considerations was that the rebels be motivated by what jurists referred to as a ta'wil, or "a plausible interpretation" that might justify, at least in their minds, rebellion as a means of redress or of carrying out the Qur'anic imperative to command what is good and forbid what is evil. It does not matter if the interpretation is "wrong" or even heterodox; what matters is that it be plausible; that the language of the Qur'an and/or Sunna or the circumstantial and contextual indicators surrounding this language could accommodate such a reading. In fact, the focus of the rebels' interpretation might even be purely "political" as opposed to religious.... In sum, it is essentially the appearance or the rebels' insistence that their actions are based on their understanding of their duty as Muslims that confers upon these actions the status of "political speech." This sets them apart from criminal acts of hirabah.
The second stipulation was that the rebels be backed by a sufficient level of force (shawkah), measured mainly in numbers and military preparedness. The jurists differed on this number. The 7th/13th century al-Qarafi notes that a number of jurists placed it at ten.... This stipulation has the effect of reserving the more lenient law of rebellion for the most serious and widespread cases of public disaffection. That is to say, the gieivances that allegedly prompt a group to rebel must be serious and widespread enough to enlist the support of significant numbers of people. Otherwise, small groups of extremists, sophomoric idealists, prurient bandits or terrorists will be denied the refuge afforded by the law of rebellion and be treated under the more severe and salutary law of hirabah. (pp. 302-303, emphasis added)
So according to Jackson, domestic terrorist acts do not qualify as hiraba following two stipulations:
- 1) If the rebels are acting under what they themselves understand to be a "reasonable" interpretation of Islamic law, such as those many fatwas issued by Islamic scholars throughout the Muslim world permitting attacks against the US;
- 2) If they are well-coordinated and use sufficient force, such as ramming fuel-laden airliners into military headquarters, government offices or skyscrapers.
In such cases, the use of hiraba does not apply, but are instead legitimate acts of rebellion. This would certainly disqualify the use of hiraba to describe the Muslim Brotherhood's "civilization-jihadist process" for destroying the US from within that Pentagon analysis Stephen Coughlin identifies, since it is both well-planned, extensive, and is coordinated with its self-identified "security apparatus", i.e. military/terror component.
Jackson unwittingly tips us off to another problem with applying hiraba for terrorism, according to traditional Islamic law, with this statement:
Indeed, a number of early jurists had associated hirabah with the activities of groups who had formally apostatized and resorted to violence in an attempt to overthrow the Islamic social and political order. (p. 305)
That is certainly no description of al-Qaida or affiliated groups, who seek to enforce an Islamic social and political order. There is apparently no justification in Islamic jurisprudence for applying the term and/or punishments of hiraba when the violence is directed at non-Muslim governments, societies or individuals. At least Jackson provides no references along those lines.
At this point, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how the use of hiraba for jihad or terrorism is warranted in any current contemporary situation relevant to the US. But there are further difficulties with Jackson's analysis. He defines hiraba as follows:
...these jurists confirm that hirabah is distinguished by its connection to the spreading of fear (ikhafah) and helplessness (àdam al-ghawth) and the fact that no effective security measures can be taken against it (taàdhdhur al-ihtiraz). (p. 296)
The difficulty here is that there are several Quranic authorizations that call for instilling terror and fear into the heart of the enemy (8:60, et al.). And in his authoritative treatment of jihad, Pakistani Brigadier General S.K. Malik in his book, The Quranic Concept of War, notes the critical element of fear and terror in waging jihad:
In war our main objective is the opponent's heart or soul, our main weapon of offence against this objective is the strength of our own souls, and to launch such an attack, we have to keep terror away from our own hearts.... Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is the end itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent's heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the end meet and merge. Terror is not a means of imposing decision on the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose on him. ([Delhi, 1992], p. 59; emphasis added)
Malik explains that the very elements that Jackson wants to attribute to the concept of hiraba, fear and helplessness, are integral to the Islamic doctrine of jihad itself. (LTC Joseph Myers examines Malik's explanation of Islamic war doctrine in his review article published in the Winter 2006-2007 edition of Parameters: The US Army War College Quarterly.)
The effort by Jim Guirard and others in the "truespeak" movement to attempt to use the Islamic lexicon against international Islamic terrorism is certainly commendable. But as we see with Sherman Jackson's own treatment of hiraba, the attempt is wide off the mark. Our enemies are no doubt amused at our attempts to appear informed on matters of Islamic law, but this erroneous exegesis is hardly the tool to strike the fear of eternal damnation into the hearts of Osama bin Laden and his followers, as Guirard has claimed for his "truespeak".
And as Walid Phares and Stephen Coughlin have already revealed, many of the Western Muslim advocates of this new approach are directly tied to known Muslim Brotherhood front groups operating in the US. As Coughlin itemizes, Sherman Jackson is a "trustee" to the North American Islamic Trust, and affiliated with the Islamic Society of North America and the Muslim Student Association, the first two of which were named as unindicted co-conspirators in the current Holy Land Foundation terror financing federal trial underway in Dallas, and the last was the original organizational wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in America. The hiraba-jihad terminology has also been endorsed by the Wahhabist Council for Islamic Education and the extremist mouthpiece Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), also named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation trial. That is telling in and of itself.
Walid Phares' warning is appropriate:
Thus the promoters of this theory of Hiraba and Mufsidoon are representing the views of classical Wahabis and the Muslim Brotherhood in their criticism of the "great leap forward" made by bin Laden. But by convincing Westerners that al Qaeda and its allies are not the real jihadists but some renegades, the advocates of this school would be causing the vision of Western defense to become blurred again so that more time could be gained by a larger, more powerful wave of Jihadism that is biding its time to strike when it chooses, under a coherent international leadership.
This new "truespeak" lexicon is not a new tool to engage terrorists groups like Al-Qaeda, but rather as Phares states, an obstacle "preventing the West from understanding jihad". The "truespeak" movement would be much more appropriate for a Madison Avenue advertising campaign, not a Global War on Terror. Given the apparent success "truespeak" and its adherents have had to date with regular briefings to senior military and policy audiences, that alone seems an indicator of a leadership unstudied and unprepared for the nuances of the terrorist doctrines opposing us.
Six years after 9/11, it is long past time for scholars in diplomatic, military, intelligence and academic circles to get a better grip on the threat we are confronting in the West and around the world. Analysts like Phares and Coughlin have already laid out a path for us to follow and the real war of ideas that needs to be waged.
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