Covert Screener Testing Still Problematic; Managerial Problems Linger

‘TSA is limited in its ability to use covert test results to strengthen aviation security’

Last November, investigators for Congress’ investigative arm, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), disclosed that they repeatedly were able to smuggle liquid bomb and incendiary explosives components through dozens of airport screening checkpoints.

Once on board a plane, HSToday.us noted in its report, “TSA, Legislators Lock Horns Over GAO Getting Explosives Past Screeners,” some of these components could have been assembled in as little as ten minutes and, if they had been successfully detonated, potentially have caused a “catastrophic” explosion, two senior GAO officials told lawmakers.

The GAO investigators told lawmakers they were able to slip past airport security screeners with liquid bomb-making components 19 times last year, and in 2006, got past screeners 21 times with incendiary devices and bomb detonators that could have “caused not insignificant explosions,” as one of the GAO investigators involved in the covert testing explained.

While the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has designed and implemented risk-based national and local covert testing programs to achieve its goals of identifying vulnerabilities in, and measuring the performance of, the aviation security system, and has begun to determine the extent to which covert testing will be used in non-aviation modes of transportation, a more recent GAO audit determined that TSA’s Office of Inspection (OI) “did not systematically record the causes of test failures or practices that resulted in higher pass rates for tests.” ....