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In December 2008, the Bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism released The World at Risk Report (WaR report) a culmination of their 6-month investigation and threat assessment.
What follows is a three section discussion on this important document and the potential impact it can have on homeland and international security. Section 1 will introduce the WaR report, including an overview of weapons of mass destruction, as well as analysis, thoughts and concerns about the document and its recommendation. Section 2 will present highlights from the World at Risk: VIEW FROM NEW YORK conference held the end of January, which included participants on the WaR Commission, as well as experts involved WMD preparedness and homeland security. Section 3 will cover an interview with Frances Townsend – former Senior Advisor to the President on Homeland Security, followed by some cautionary summary points to ponder.
INTRODUCTION
Terrorism and the concept of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), though not new, have never the less become defining issues in the early 21st century, the dramatic downturn in the global economy notwithstanding.
Of great concern to preparedness professionals, and likely the readers of FSM, is the thought process of many Americans – a widespread disconnect between global events and domestic security, including the notion that economic issues are distinct and unrelated from threats to the homeland. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Global events – from combative or competitive nations – can and do affect us on a daily basis, from impacting our personal income, or our security. The seemingly unending “bailouts” can force reductions in funding for critical preparedness programs at a time when loss of momentum in our capacity building could portend disastrous outcomes.
While it is understandable that the economy is an important issue, especially given the magnitude of layoffs reported in the media on a weekly basis, one has to wonder if the disparity between coverage on the economy compared to geoglobal and homeland security issues hasn’t been exacerbated by the mainstream media for a variety of issues that will be discussed in subsequent articles. The worrisome and predictable result is evident in polling results – the economy is number one, with Iraq, domestic security and terrorism being distant runners up. The U.S. is in a period of 9/11 amnesia and the more removed we are from 2001 without a successful attack against us – the less intense public concern will be. Yet we know there have been foiled attacks against the homeland. Clearly the task before us as preparedness professionals is to keep the public aware of the threat – not to foment fear, but to foster continued support and efforts to enhancing threat reduction and capacity to handle a likely future terrorist attack. And the next time it might not involve explosives….
“The greatest threat to mankind’s continued existence is the virus” – Joshua Lederberg, Nobel Laureate
SECTION ONE: THE WORLD AT RISK REPORT
ORIGIN OF THE COMMISSION
In the aftermath of the 9/11 Commission Report and Act of 2007 (PL 110-53), a Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation and Terrorism was empanelled. By Congressional mandate the Commission was given 180 days to assess any and all of the nations activities to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism, then to provide recommendations to address those threats. The results of their six month efforts – The World at Risk Report.
INTENT OF THE REPORT
“The intent of this report is neither to frighten nor to reassure the American people about the current state of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. It is to underscore that the U.S. government has yet to fully adapt to these circumstances, and to convey the sobering reality that the risks are growing faster than our multilayered defenses. Our margin of safety is shrinking, not growing. “ – from the Commission letter to President Bush.
The Commission continues in their executive summary – “In those moments of danger (author’s note: referring to the Islamabad bombings 9/20/08 but just as easily 9/11 or Mumbai ), we are all, first and foremost, citizens of a world at risk, with the common cause of protecting the innocent and preserving our way of life. It is our hope to break the all-too-familiar cycle in which disaster strikes, and a commission is formed to report to us about what our governments should have known and done to keep us safe. This time we do know. We know the threat we face. We know that our margin of safety is shrinking, not growing. And we know what we must do to counter the risk. There is no excuse now for allowing domestic partisanship or international rivalries to prevent or delay the actions that must be taken. We need unity at all levels – nationally, locally and among people all across the globe. There is still time to defend ourselves, if we act with the urgency called for by the nature of the threat that confronts us. Sounding that call for urgent action is the purpose of this report.”
Clearly one of the goals for the Commission is to engage the public in the hope of reducing the disparity between concern about and reality of the threats facing us.
The World at Risk Report is a 160 page document (available here and in bookstores) that is designed to raise awareness about the global threat to mankind – not just the United States – that such weapons pose. The Commission hopes to educate and empower the world community in the hope that collectively greater cooperation between governments will result in tighter security to protect, limit or reduce potentially deadly threats from nuclear materials, and identify as well as protect, limit, or control and in certain cases even destroy biological weapons capabilities possessed by certain entities.
Caveat! All government reports are like bikinis; what they reveal is interesting, what they hide is essential. The World at Risk Report (WAR) is no different.
To be sure, it is a daunting task to protect an open society such as the United States. The Commission undertook an important project – to raise awareness about the global threats biological and nuclear/radiological weapons pose to the world and courageously put forth recommendations, some politically or institutionally delicate ones, to thwart the risks. From an awareness perspective, given it is also available as a paperback book (Vintage Books), sold at the big three (Amazon, Barnes and Noble, Borders), which are conveniently highlighted on the Commission web site, people are bound to notice. This is clearly a good move towards increasing visibility and awareness about the threats we face.
Upon first blush, while increasing awareness about the threat is well done, what the average citizen can do, must do, remains in need of greater detail. But in all fairness, their job was to raise awareness and identify weaknesses in our preparedness schema; and that they have.
Engaging and empowering the public has been a persistent disconnect since 9/11. The Government lost a fair amount of credibility. While duct tape worked great for MacGyver, it clearly left a lot to be desired with the average citizen, especially on top of the suggestion to use plastic sheeting – not a great idea – certainly not healthy if you heat your house with wood….plastic is flammable, yes? Somewhere between duct tape, plastic sheets and warning against Cipro ® hoarding, the government lines of communications with the public in terms of useful, practical and timely preparedness information broke down; reestablishing both the lines of communications and the credibility of the message are sorely needed – and the commission does a good job underscoring that vulnerability.
Before we delve into some of the strengths and weaknesses of the report, it is important to share a common framework on the agents discussed or omitted, the power to harm that each category of WMD possesses, as well as the availability and risk each pose to our security.
PRIMER ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)
What follows is a brief overview of the various classes of agents within the five main categories of WMD, although one schema uses three categories. Commonly the acronym CBRNE is used to highlight WMD- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Eplosive; sometimes just NBC – Nuclear, Chemical or Biological, is used.
Chemical Weapons
Strictly speaking, virtually any toxicant – toxic chemical can be used as a weapon. However, in preparedness circles, chemical weapons are usually divided into two categories – military type weapons – nerve agents, toxic inhalation sources (chlorine), vesicants (mustard), blood agents (cyanide) and weapons of adaptation – dangerous industrial chemicals often referred to as hazardous materials or HAZMAT.
The first large-scale use of chemical warfare agents was of chlorine in Ypres, Belgium in April of 1915; resulting in approximately 5,000 deaths along a five mile front. In addition to harming soldiers, contamination and exposure of unintended targets occurred. Insurgents have used chlorine against U.S. troops in Iraq over the last few years; intelligence sources suggest insurgents continue to seek advanced chemical weapons to use against U.S. forces.
Among the most worrisome of chemical weapons are the nerve agents – Sarin, Soman, Vx for example. These are highly toxic materials designed to incapacitate and kill large numbers of victims – seizures, nausea and vomiting, with severe cardiac and respiratory deterioration can occur. In the late 1980s, military grade nerve agents were used, along with mustard agents, in the Iraq -ran War. As recently as 1995, the Aum Shumrikyo cult in Japan released a dilute form of Sarin in a Tokyo subway, resulting in numerous victims and deaths. Had the chemical not been hastily made and released, likely more deaths would have occurred.
Terrorists are very good at resource adaptation. Who would have thought four commercial airliners would be used in a coordinated attack against the United States? Let us not forget that toxic chemicals are produced in large quantity across our nation, and in plants that are often downwind of population centers. Although the chemical industry in general has tried to increase their security since 9/11, some plants remain easy targets and there remain rail and highway transportation as vulnerabilities. Consider Bhopal – where methyl isocyanate was released, injuring tens of thousands. That was an accident – imagine someone intentionally tampering with a chlorine tanker. “Railroad security” in many areas is an oxymoron.
While the United States and Russia have perhaps some of the largest stores of nerve agents, other countries possess them. A related family of chemicals with similar characteristics – organophosphate pesticides (poor man’s nerve agents) – can also be readily found in weakened forms in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The underlying chemical ingredients to synthesize nerve agents are readily available worldwide. Although most HAZMAT teams are well schooled in responding to such threats, preparedness across other preparedness agencies remains inconsistent. Health care facilities – in spite of millions being spent through HRSA and HHS to ramp up their response capabilities – remain inconsistently prepared as well.
Biological Weapons
Biological weapons (BW) sometimes referred to as poor man’s nukes, are disease-causing microbes – pathogens – viruses, parasites, fungus or bacteria, or the toxins that they produce. In the truest sense of the term when these pathogens are used as a military weapon, they get refined and processed for optimal delivery to cause death to people, animals or crops, i.e. living things, or to disable groups. Many of the pathogens or their toxins are readily found in nature. Typically a “weaponized” pathogen – one that has been adapted for intentional use – is potentially more dangerous than naturally occurring ones. However that distinction is often academic. Consider pneumonic plague – a naturally occurring illness caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis - untreated it is a virtual death sentence.
Pathogens, like other weapons have distinct characteristics that both influence their suitability for selection, as well as assist in diagnosing them, such as
1. The incubation period – the time from exposure to the development of clinical illness. Some pathogens or toxins can cause illness within hours; others require several days.
2. Infectivity, which underscores the pathogens ability to infect a host (and the type of vulnerable host). Some viruses, for example, are highly host specific, like monkeypox, but crossover to humans is possible, as was seen in Wisconsin in 2003.
3. Transmissibility, which can be thought of in the broadest sense as contagion (can be spread person to person) or non contagion. Some bioweapon illness can be spread person to person such as smallpox, while others like inhalation anthrax illness, cannot (at least the natural forms).
4. Virulence is the likelihood of causing severe disease; plague, Ebola, inhalation anthrax and ricin toxin are all capable of causing death in a high percent of those exposed.
5. Persistence is how long the pathogen can survive in the environment (and the type of conditions to eradicate it). Anthrax spores are very hearty and can survive extreme outdoor conditions.
Biological agents have been further classified as Category A (most deadly and likely to cause widespread harm), B and C.
Anthrax is considered one of the prototypical Category A biological weapons – it is found in nature as well as numerous research labs worldwide, is capable of causing several distinct patterns of illness, and in the most severe forms (inhalational, gastrointestinal) unless treated early, carries a high case fatality rate, and as a hearty bacteria, persistent in the environment.
Bioweapons such as brucellosis were used in WWI against the animals critical to the war effort.
Russia is said to have more scientists working on plague (Yersinia pestis) than the U.S. has on its entire bioweapons program. And, it remains shrouded in secrecy behind layers of Russian military, political intelligence apparatus and denial. Outside examination is limited. Russia is rarely forthcoming about anything relating to their security: when the Former Soviet Union had a small release of bioweapon anthrax in Sverdlovsk, resulting in deaths, denial was the watch word until information leaked out. Relying upon a nation that aggressively guards its secrets, even while not necessarily protecting its facilities, is a weakness in global limitation of WMD diversion, theft or proliferation.
Numerous other nations have bioweapons programs, too. Relatively easy to procure and develop, it is a growing global threat. Some of these countries, as you can imagine, do not have a great incentive to destroy their stockpiles, since the objective – regional domination or countering the threat of an adversary – make it unlikely biological weapons will go away any time soon.
Bioterrorism (BT) is the intentional use of microbes or their toxins to cause harm to humans and other living organisms, to influence the conduct of government, to intimidate or coerce a civilian population. Clearly the anthrax events of 2001 demonstrated the potential impact a biological can cause. Consider the “white powder” events and changes in how the mail is handled at high value facilities! Consider the millions of people affected by the “fear factor” even though 22 actually became ill and five died. But a biological was used in 1984 as the Rajneesh cult spread salmonella bacteria at salad bars in the hope of sickening enough local citizens to keep them from turning out to vote! Over 700 were sickened. Moreover, it took almost a year before public health officials, local health care professionals and law enforcement could put all the pieces together and determine these illnesses were part of a concerted effort.
Biological weapons, if dispersed in a large, unvaccinated or unprotected (i.e. susceptible) population, will result in numerous illnesses, deaths, perhaps disfigurement (smallpox) or disability. If the target is agriculture – the impact economically as well as to society could be significant. Regardless of the target, it will undermine public confidence in the government, and result in a rush on health care facilities from the worried well in addition to the potentially sick.
And herein rests one of the critical challenges in addressing biological weapons: unless the pathogen is released in proximity to a detector capable of real time detection (not widely available), biological weapons are stealth weapons! The size of dust particles at best…there will not be a bang, mushroom cloud or puff of purple smoke to announce the release! No noise, no notice. This also makes it hard to identify the perpetrator. S/he is long gone by the time anyone figures it out. The “event” has occurred and everyone has left the scene, while the incubation clock still ticks away! A common exposure may not result in all victims presenting at the same time at the same health care facility. So not only will the physician have to correctly diagnose the patient, s/he will have to communicate it in live time to other health care facilities in the locality and, if anyone has left the area….even nationwide or regionally. Such communication often relying upon the efficiency of the local health department – public health capacity is inconsistent nationwide, from agencies such as Los Angeles or New York City being blessed with well trained professionals and significant expertise, to others which have poorly trained directors with few resources. Another example of a government enterprise that has had so much mission creep as to be all but useless in many regions, but more on this in a future article.
Of additional concern is the number of laboratories nationwide and worldwide that are conducting research on naturally occurring deadly pathogens, as well as genetically altered ones. Research labs handling deadly pathogens are labeled based upon their biosecurity level (BSL) – from “1” being the least secure and dedicated to relatively low risk pathogens, to “4,”+++ which contain the most deadly forms; those without known cures. These facilities, including BSL 3 are not nearly as well secured as they should be. As reported in The WaR Report agents of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found several BSL 3 and 4 labs that had several security vulnerabilities.
But here’s the sobering reality – while it takes resources and expertise to refine a naturally occurring pathogen for advanced or military bioweapon applications, the vast array of these microbes, if obtained and processed properly, could result in less elegant but no less deadly weapons against an unprotected civilian population. Sick people can become weapons in and of themselves if the disease is contagious. Given our inability to secure the borders, and airport security is weak in terms of identifying biological or chemical threats – a terrorist extremist turned passenger with a passport, sick with plague or carrying a simple dispersal atomizer could cause a bit of angst!
Al Qaeda has made no secret about wanting biological and nuclear weapons. Other cults have experimented with bioweapons. And as the proliferation of these materials, the encroachment of remote lands with global expansion and easy travel between nations increases, so does the risk.
Take home message on biological weapon illness – if we cannot limit malefactors access to deadly pathogens, do not prevent the event, and cannot diagnose the subsequent illness early…..don’t make any long term plans.
Radiological Weapons
Elements that emit energy in the form of ionizing radiation are referred to as radioactive materials. Such radiation sources are ubiquitous – in industry and healthcare as well as military and nuclear sites. The most “watched” from a potential weapon perspective are cesium, americium, cobalt, uranium and depleted uranium. While most of them are not highly toxic to large groups, nor can they necessarily cause a thermonuclear reaction (highly enriched uranium [HEU] being the exception in that group) can cause limited illness if inhaled, ingested or carelessly handled, and would be an environmental challenge.
Thefts of cesium sources nationwide have occurred over the last few years; recovery of the materials remains elusive. Given cesium exposure from an “abandoned” medical device caused one of the largest radiation events in the Western Hemisphere in 1987 in Goiania, Brazil, better security is necessary to protect medical and industrial radiation sources.
Placing radioactive materials with explosives could cause wide dispersal. Though the death rate would pale compared to a nuclear event, the public concern and area contamination, as well as some radiation illness would make such a weapon an effective tool of terrorists. Chechnyans have reportedly attempted to deploy simple radiological devices in Moscow and elsewhere.
The Commission opted to not include radiological threats as high focus. We can debate whether dispersed radioactive materials are as big a threat that was portrayed in the movie Dirty Bomb – nevertheless, securing these materials should be a priority; one that continues to remain elusive. Consider the article “Homeland Security – Is this 2008 or 2001? Seven years and Still Playing Catch Up” that appeared in FSM, discussing the recent initiative by DHS to secure easy access radiological materials. We have a long way to go!
Nuclear Weapons
Just think Armageddon! The mushroom cloud. Call it a day. Too dramatic? Think Hiroshima. Crude weapon by today’s standard, but clearly wreaked havoc on two Japanese cities. Okay, think suitcase nuke – the Former Soviet Union “cannot account for all of them.” Great news for all. At least they are “only” one kiloton, so some of the city will be left standing.
Nuclear weapons – whether atomic or hydrogen bombs – unleash enormous energy in the form of blast, heat and radiation. Initial deaths would be the result of a catastrophic explosion – trauma, burns and blast injuries. Radiation injury would also occur. Environmental contamination would result. These are weapons that use either HEU or plutonium in such a way as to create a nuclear reaction – that is release the energy contained in the atomic core of the elements. In the late 1930s, scientists learned that bombarding uranium with neutrons would cause a process that ultimately released enormous energy – and in the right configuration, as we’ve seen, enough energy to destroy a city.
Both nuclear materials and the “know how” to create an atomic bomb are highly monitored but not completely secured.
Explosives
Globally, explosives still represent the weapon of choice for over 80% of terrorist events. Easily procured, readily available and relatively easy to work with, it is unlikely explosives will be supplanted as first line threats. However, terrorists are getting creative with them – in Israel, Palestinian homicide bombers have been known to mix blood thinners, rat poison and other toxicants in with the shrapnel of their explosive devices and in Iraq chlorine has been used along with explosives.
THE COMMISSION AND WMD THREATS
While it is clear the Commission has done its homework and admirably provides an overview of the nuclear and biological threats to date. The background information is nicely done. They well inform on the “what.” Though clearly the product of serious players working long hours – a commendable project to be sure, some key issues…the “where’s the beef” … at times remain elusive; it is in the “how to” that sometimes leaves us hanging. But perhaps that is also part of the mission – to garner support and encourage idea sharing.
On Biologicals
The Commission does a good job introducing the concept of biological and nuclear weapons. However their emphasis on anthrax during the aftermath of 2001, though not a bad idea, nevertheless leaves out of the discourse several other Category A agents such as smallpox, botulinum toxin, plague, tularemia and Ebola virus (viral hemorrhagic fever viruses).
Of the 12 recommendations, two are focused solely on biological weapons and two others address both nuclear and biological.
The Commission rightly alerts us that the number of BSL 3 and 4 labs will continue to increase, and their placement may very well be in metropolitan areas. Moreover, security regulations are inconsistent. Federal oversight only applies to facilities with selected pathogens, or receiving certain funding. Moreover, the scientific community is more concerned with information exchange than materials containment. Their suggestion to create a culture of security is a good thought. Money isn’t the answer. Protecting dangerous materials should be out of a sense of duty. But the “how to” is always where the road and the rubber meet.
Preparedness against avian flu and SARS – though these are not WMD per se, was a good move considering public concern over these issues. A benefit… our ability to handle epidemics also increases the likelihood of a better response to an intentional event. And that is sorely needed nationwide. Consider an online survey conducted by the Journal of Emergency Medical Services (JEMS) – one of the leading professional journals for emergency responders – medics, ER physicians, EMTs and emergency response agencies. Readers were asked if they had a plan for operations during a pandemic flu outbreak. Only 17% of total respondents answered “yes” – put another way, 83% of those who responded – the same folks tasked with providing emergency response capacity did NOT have a plan. The members of the Commission should vocalize this vulnerability at their next opportunity.
Which leads to the next concern of The Report – either emphasizing public health to the exclusion of private medicine or lumping them together. Recall that it was a private practice infectious disease specialist physicianwho diagnosed the first case of inhalation anthrax in Florida, not the public health clinicians or directors. His diagnosis would lead to public health – especially the CDC – involvement. But realize had not the private practice physician made the diagnosis, public health would not have been involved. It is important to recognize that most people, most victims will present to health care facilities, doc in the boxes, urgent care centers and the traditional “doctors office.” Public health clinics, critical infrastructure to be sure, are not representative of the bulk of health care visits. And, they certainly do not provide care to folks likely to be in high threat targets – Congress, the Pentagon, the Sears Tower, and sporting events like the Super Bowl. As such, the Commission and government need to recognize the separate but interrelatedness of both health care communities. And, that in a world of competing demands, the average physician, over encumbered by paperwork, HMO constraints forcing the 12-second visit, and lack of direct feedback from the federal preparedness community, will need to be invited to the table as critical infrastructure to be part of a meaningful dialogue and sustained process of preparedness. We will do it as our duty; but the “how to” is always critical. The current schema – toss money at hospitals which then throw together some awareness lectures for their staffs without context or preparedness framework – is a Band Aid® approach; it needs to change.
One issue they raise is: should the CDC and HHS remain at the forefront of security oversight of labs with BSL pathogens? Are they too close to the situation to be both scientific advisor and security watchdog? Good point. No one doubts the enormous value of the CDC to public preparedness, but the authors of The Report are absolutely correct – we need to a high level individual or office responsible for overseeing the security of biological facilities and materials.
The Report has numerous valid and valuable recommendations. It is a great starting point – and perhaps roadmap to enhance current activities.
ON NUCLEAR
Clearly the nightmare scenario – a terrorist unleashing a thermonuclear device in a major US city.
The Commission does an excellent job providing a brief but focused overview of the various nuclear players and wannabes internationally, as well as the hot spots of risk. Additionally they discuss certain critical vulnerabilities including past thefts of nuclear materials. Among the several actions devoted to the nuclear threat, some very specific ones warrant highlighting –
1. Increasing support for the International Atomic Energy Agency.
2. The .U.S should orchestrate international consensus to block additional countries from obtaining enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.
An action item – worth mentioning with a caveat is:
“The new US policy towards Pakistan should include economic assistance that helps Pakistan improve the services it provides to its people and create greater opportunities for education and commerce, especially in the FATA.”
That is well and good but a critical omission is the word “oversight.” How much money has already been pumped into Pakistan with questionable results? Al Qaeda is very likely enjoying safe harbor in parts of Pakistan. Without exerting greater pressure and oversight, tossing money into FATA or anywhere else for that matter, without proper security to protect our personnel and investment, as well as the locals who will avail themselves of our resources, deadly attacks against girls trying to get an education as has happened in Afghanistan or diversion of funds to corrupt politicians is likely to occur.
WHY NOT INCLUDE CHEMICAL WEAPONS?
One of the first questions that comes to mind – why not emphasize chemical weapons in the Report? If one wants to raise awareness about deadly threats, would it not be prudent to discuss at least all the NBC WMD agents – their availability and the jeopardy each has placed on mankind over the last 30 years, not just biological and nuclear weapons?
As Inauguration events were unfolding and the television screens would pop in various messages – “President Bush and President Elect Obama having coffee,” “10,000 National Guard troops deployed to assist local law enforcement,” one sign of the times stood out: “Chem-bio detectors deployed throughout the crowds.” Intermixed with the seemingly innocuous notices, was perhaps an overlooked but chilling thought – yes chemical and biological weapons are available and there are folks who without conscience or compunction will use them on civilians. Reinforcing that concern, the political commentator described the latest up-armored presidential limousine – “Cadillac One” – and as he is reading off the list of features of the new vehicle….thickness of armored doors, Kevlar ® reinforced tires, in the same sentence “and it is hermetically sealed in case of a chemical attack.”
If chemical threats aren’t worthy of consideration as focus areas in the Report, why is Cadillac One tricked out to withstand such an attack? Because chemical weapons represent a viable threat. Though not as cataclysmic as a nuclear detonation or widespread release of a deadly pathogen, ask the ,5500 folks in the Tokyo subway who were affected by the nerve agent assault what they think about chemical weapons. Chemicals can be persistent, posing an environmental threat, as well as incapacitating or deadly. Plus the mere mention of nerve agent is scary to those not fortunate enough to have a Mark I kit (nerve agent antidotes) in their backpack.
According to the report,” while the mandate of the Commission was to examine the full sweep of the challenges posed by the nexus of terrorist activity and the proliferation of all forms of WMD – chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear – we concluded early in our deliberations that this report should focus solely on the two types of WMD categories that have the greatest potential to kill in the most massive numbers: biological and nuclear weapons.”
Not wanting to put too fine a point on the issue, but chemicals have and continue to be a threat. While their assertions are correct – if we increase our overall security, intelligence and preparedness capabilities, we will be better able to address chemical, what you focus on you get results in. Creating a culture of security mindedness is a worthy goal. We need to extend that mantle of concern across the “full sweep of challenges.” Fortunately it is not an insurmountable hurdle to extend concern to include chemical as the recommendations of the Commission are implemented. And implemented they should be.
DISCUSSION
Big Picture
A major benefit of the Report is recommending the need to better engage the public. But, how to enact some of the recommendations, and just what exactly can the average citizen do besides be more alert, notify suspicious activity, or have a preparedness plan, remain inconsistent. Great concepts but the angels are always in the details. For example, should the public commit to getting annual flu vaccines, especially against the backdrop o anti-vaccine activism. Should citizen response groups continue? In what form? How do we foster greater law enforcement – civilian partnerships?
The Commission recommendations – at the 20,000 foot policy level are right on point, even if some of the assumptions about terrorist capabilities can be argued. We all know the definition of an “expert.” I always worry when “experts” suggest an adversary isn’t capable of something like biological weapons, because he hasn’t used it yet. I seem to recall “expert” examiners opining about the stage of the North Korean nuclear weapons programs a few years ago, claiming they had made little progress, only to shortly thereafter be corrected by the revelation that such weapons were possessed. If these are the same “experts” involved in the Iran analysis, those school desks are looking mighty appealing….don’t toss out those 1960s Civil Defense warnings “what to do in a nuclear event.” That said, given the fact the U.S. educates a lot of potential terrorists or sympathizers, the know how to build radiologicals and release even rudimentary biological weapons is not far from the grasp of our adversaries, if not yet in their hands.
Some of the recommendations rely upon international cooperation, especially with Russia and China. Given both nations have a vested interest in limiting US influence as well as WMD proliferation – some might argue objectives at odds with themselves – and recognizing both countries have strong ties to Iran and other nations interested in advancing their nuclear capabilities, such cooperation may continue to be tenuous. Clearly one of the major mistakes of the 20th century was giving China “most favored nation” status, and with it, advanced technologies – which ultimately have found form in missile design and migrated into North Korea, Syria and Iran. Putting the genie back into the bottle is easier said than done. Nevertheless, trying to find common ground, or parlaying something we have that others want, in exchange for limiting WMD proliferation, is a policy worth continuing. So far we have had some success in limiting the spread of nuclear materials; as Russia produces much of the worlds polonium and the US is conveniently one of the largest purchasers, some sort of balance is being achieved, Bur realize it doesn’t take much to make a weapon – and materials have been stolen in amounts that come perilously close to the requisite quantity for a device.
Another area of concern is the expectation that somehow the clock can be turned back in Iran, North Korea and other regimes led by folks committed to acquiring a military advantage. Iran has advanced nuclear material processing in at least two well protected underground facilities – and their desire for nuclear power is unwavering. Although clearly we cannot toss in the towel and need to use every resource at our disposal, it must be tempered by the reality that Russia and China have a vested interest in Iran. Russia and Iran share energy and other commercial interests.
Russia will continue to play both ends of the deal. But they too have a radical Muslim problem and an economy built upon gas, oil and the spoils of industrial espionage. We have some common ground and opportunities to “do business.” But we had start better playing Russia – Putin, Inc. – with greater savvy.
Focusing on Pakistan is critical. It truly is the intersection of nuclear weapons and terrorism. Pakistan is also playing both ends against the middle – as allies and threat. The value of the Commission recommendation to exert greater influence, especially as pertains to the FATA region cannot be overestimated.
They also recommend that the intelligence community needs to upgrade their science and technology expertise especially as pertain to WMD is on target. Their suggestion that our law enforcement and intelligence organizations increase their interaction with the scientific community, as well as continue recruiting expertise in WMD, is insightful and important. But that pesky set of details – corporate cultures, historic rivalries and economics – all must be managed if progress is to continue.
The Commission is correct that we cannot afford to regress, and in fact must now more than ever redouble our efforts and commitment – in people, money and programming, but we need to do it more focused and smarter. The unwieldy bureaucracy at the federal level engaged in and overseeing this entity called “preparedness” needs to be streamlined.
From a preparedness perspective, the insights shared on the current global threat situation make the World at Risk Report worthwhile reading.
Part Two will focus on the World at Risk: View from New York” conference held in January.
