Panetta, Preservationists and Problems with U.S. Intelligence

(Compiler's note: Yes, this is another must read article.)

by Steve Schippert

If you want to know what's wrong with the U.S. intelligence community (IC), just read Jeff Stein's latest at Congressional Quarterly's Spy Talk. Before recounting a very telling (and not uncommon) private conversation with a veteran U.S. intelligence professional, he nails it early on.

Word hasn't leaked yet, but I wouldn't be surprised if President-elect Barack Obama has already figured out that when he wants quick answers to what's going on in the world, the last person to ask is the head of U.S. intelligence.

The steady deterioration of personnel and standards of intelligence analysis, especially at the CIA, has been going on for decades, a number of former top intelligence officials I know say.

The tip of the rot surfaces from time to time, such as with the 9/11 surprise and the gimcrackery reports on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

The dogs howl and the caravan moves on. Nothing changes, many well placed former intelligence officials have been telling me. But the current, possibly fatal dangers we face demand the problems be fixed.

We've been spending too much time chattering about the operations side of intelligence lately, they say, in particular whether Leon Panetta, the former OMB head and chief of staff to President Clinton, is up to handling the spies and back-alley guys and gals.

But officials have been reminding me that it was the dismally poor analysis of intelligence that enabled President Bush to lead the nation into the disastrous invasion of Iraq — not faulty espionage (such as it was).

And it's the analysis served up by the CIA and other spy agencies, they point out, that will guide President Obama's decisions on Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and North Korea, among other front-burner emergencies.

Nailed. It's weak analysis based on incomplete information (it's intelligence after all, not history) too often communicated in career-safe language rather than with actual analytical conclusions. It's an abject fear of being wrong. Well, if you're afraid to be wrong, you lack the courage to be right. And if that's the milquetoast case, the product you are giving me is nearly worthless.

My colleague Michael Tanji is a former supervisory officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency, and he understands, painfully, the inner workings of the intelligence bureaucratic Behemoth. His insight is important to consider.

Jeff Stein drives home the point that this is what you get when:

You don't have the stones to do analysis

You don't have the brains to do analysis

You treat analysts like LEGO blocks

Contrary to the common expectation — for those that actually bother to read declassified NIEs and the like — intelligence analysis isn't telling people what they already know. 'Climate change can lead to instability . . .' No kidding? As a matter of fact, analysis in popular culture is more representative of what it should be behind closed doors because, once you suspend disbelief on how they get the information, it inevitably turns out to be exactly the right piece of information a decision-maker needs exactly when he needs it. Unfortunately in real life good information is rare and usually late, so decisions are made with what is lying around and delivered by people who communicate in such a way so as to never be wrong.

And, equally important, the communication is also couched in careful language for the writer (or presenter) to be able to likewise claim some degree of being right. It is too often about the preservation of a career rather than the actual service of intelligence. Intelligence is already an inexact science. It used to be, in fact, an art. Now? Not so much.

I've studied conflicts, regions and groups and written a fair amount of analysis over the years. Some of it has been well recieved, some of it not. Some of it proved on the mark, and again, some of it not so much. But that's OK — that's analysis. For me, one thing has always been constant; I have simply never been afraid to be wrong. I have, however, been very afraid of being still and unimaginative in my general analytical approach. What relatively little I have been able to produce — with limited resources in comparison to the professional intelligence community — I have always been open to being wrong and being criticized (with the latter being quite instructive). If I knew all the facts with unlimited data, I'd be performing the job of either a historian or Nostradamus.

But what good are all the resources in the world if the approach is dictated, consciously or unconsciously, by an instilled and institutionalized abject fear of being wrong? Intelligence analysis is about determining and communicating what we think we know about what we think we know. If it were dealing with known facts, it would be the New York Times (OK, very poor example) and not a National Intelligence Estimate.

Those who consume intelligence products — from the President's Daily Briefing, to National Intelligence Estimates, to on-demand regional/conflict/groups reports and analyses and (closed-door) congressional reports and testimonies — must acknowledge the inexact nature of intelligence and stop demanding perfection. They must understand — and acknowledge to the writers and presenters — that they are dealing with intelligence analysis and not historical record. This will go a long way toward improving the product put before them, which is used to make critical national security decisions.

And while Michael Tanji's experienced insght is important, his solutions to the problem at hand are also straightforward.

The Fix?

Do it right and forget what the commentariat and pure-play politicians think. People who know intelligence know the difference between bad analysis and bad information. Lay blame where it belongs, not on the easy target. Most "intelligence" problems are information problems, or more precisely the lack thereof. Politicians: Don't hold a witch-hunt for collectors who do their jobs. Analysts: fill out your reporting eval forms; meet your collection manager and craft good requirements.

There is no fixing the newbies save for time on task. You could jump-start things by making it attractive to mid-careerists to return to the fold. Read any book on why employees leave (hint: it's not about the money) and it applies to the IC. Fix those things and watch the Lorax come back.

A while ago, while Porter Goss was at the CIA, Michael wrote a report titled simply "Why Intelligence Reform Matters". If you are concerned about or interested in the ailments of the American intelligence community, it's recommended reading.

With all of this, the question being bounced around today is whether or not Leon Panetta is the man for the job. As Eli Lake's report today makes clear, he comes with significant hurdles. Most notably questioned is his role in the extraordinary-rendition policy of the Clinton administration, as a man coming into the Obama administration vocally opposed to such practices. Ironically, the same incoming administration is already seeking to close Guantanamo Bay, the one detention facility under our own auspices (outside the continental United States) expressly for terrorists captured alive.

I remain unconvinced that Panetta is capable of, or even inclined towards, bringing about the needed reforms in the CIA, to say nothing of the myriad other alphabet soup agencies. I am, however, convinced at this point that such reforms can likely only be brought about by a talented and uniquely qualified individual from outside the established ranks of the intelligence community. Leon Panetta just doesn't strike me as "that guy."

The challenges ahead for American intelligence are clearly significant. Optimism, unfortunately, is a scarce commodity.