by Mark Noonan
When our military commanders say that the situation in Afghanistan will get worse before it gets better, here’s why:
The Asia Times highlights the greatest proximate danger from fast-breaking developments in Pakistan. The truce between the Taliban and the fracturing Pakistani government has released thousands of fighters to begin an offensive in [Afghanistan].
In addition, after striking peace deals with the Pakistani security forces, the newly formed United Front of Taliban in the Pakistani tribal areas is ready to pump at least 15,000 to 20,000 fresh fighters into Afghanistan. These are expected to start crossing the rugged - and unmanned - border in April.
Bill Roggio describes how the fight seems to have drained out of some parts of the Pakistani armed forces, who have now resorted to try and buy the Taliban off.
The military ceased operations in Swat in February 2009 after it failed to dislodge the Taliban. … Javed and the military have refused to respond to the Taliban infractions. Javeed even went out of his way to praise Mullah Fazlullah. He described Fazlullah as a “good human being,” Daily Times reported.
Javed’s [the Malakand Division Commissioner] proposal to integrate the Taliban into the security forces comes as the US Congress is debating a $20 billion aid package to Pakistan. Senators John Kerry and Richard Lugar have proposed giving Pakistan a one-time $5 billion grant plus a 10 year aid package worth $15 billion. Some of this money is slated to improve the security forces in Paksitan’s Northwest Frontier Province and the Taliban-controlled tribal agencies.
As a side note and as illustration for how long this problem really has been going on, one of Winston Churchill’s first books was entitled The Malakand Field Force, describing a punitive expedition Churchill participated in back in 1897. The only difference between then and now is that the screwballs in the area can reach out and cause death and destruction in our area of the world, too. And any attempt we make to clean up the mess will be a long, drawn out and tediously difficult task.
But we must do it - we cannot permit Pakistan to disintegrate, at least not without careful control by ourselves and complete accounting of Pakistan’s nuclear program. So, what should we do?
Part of it we’re already doing - sending more troops to Afghanistan in order to prepare for battle against the greatly increased Taliban forces we’re likely to meet from Spring forward. We’re also, from what I understand, stepping up nation-building activities in order to improve Afghan government authority and control, as well as build up the Afghan national army. But sitting in Afghanistan and fighting the Taliban won’t do the trick - we’ll have to get at the source of the trouble.
As long as the government of Pakistan is working to defeat the Taliban and associated tribal forces, then we must apply ourselves, as difficult as it is, to the Pakistani government. But if, as it appears, the Pakistani government becomes unwilling or unable to assist us, we’ll have to do it on our own. And if the government of Pakistan disintegrates, then we’ll have to be ready to move into at least substantial areas of Pakistan in order to defeat our enemies and control those part of the Pakistani military arsenal which can be used by the terrorists to attack the United States and our allies.
If we fail to do our part, as necessary, then we can look forward to, at best, parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan becoming a safe-haven for terrorists where they can gather forces, plot attacks and launch them against us. At worst, Pakistan will become a completely failed State, easy prey to highly organized Islamist minorities who are willing to use whatever cruelty proves necessary to assert their control - including control over Pakistan’s nuclear force. Furthermore, we must pay close attention to the needs of India in this - the Pakistani government, of itself, is a difficult enough entity to deal with, but if India faces radical Islamists in control of nuclear weapons minutes away from major Indian metropolises, India might feel - very justifiably - compelled to act.
In order to preserve our allies and secure peace, we might have to steel ourselves to a protracted and bloody campaign in south central Asia - and the big question: does Obama perceive the risks? Does he have the courage to stick it out, should it all fall apart?
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