Gaps in preparation and staffing still need to be addressed.
Though most Americans have grown up taking it for granted, the orderly inaugural transitions between political administrations we’re accustomed to represent quite an extraordinary achievement historically. Insuring them even in the best of times has always been a complex challenge. In an era when terrorist organizations avidly search for targets of optimum opportunity to disrupt civil societies, however, that challenge has become even more daunting.
With the first post 9-11 governmental transition just months away the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia late last week held a hearing examining the current status of transitional planning by DHS and other government agencies in advance of 1-20-09.
Speaking for DHS Elaine C. Duke, undersecretary of homeland security, outlined the agency’s current action plan.
With the first post 9-11 governmental transition just months away the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia late last week held a hearing examining the current status of transitional planning by DHS and other government agencies in advance of 1-20-09.
Speaking for DHS Elaine C. Duke, undersecretary of homeland security, outlined the agency’s current action plan.
“In January 2009, the Federal government will undergo a transition from one Administration to the next,” she said. ‘Historically,” she added, “we know terrorists perceive government transitions to be periods of increased vulnerability. The attacks in Madrid in 2004, in London in 2005, and in Glasgow in 2007 all took place during transitions. The first World Trade Center attack in 1993, as well as the September 11th attacks occurred within the first year of new Administrations. At DHS, we are doing everything necessary to ensure we are prepared for the upcoming Presidential transition and that there will be no gaps in our leadership team, planning efforts, or mission success.”
Duke said that transition efforts began in the Spring of 2007 when DHS began identifying critical positions using what she called a “Critical Position Succession Planning template” to ensure a pipeline of successors to the most critical positions within the organization. As part of this process, Duke said, DHS identified senior career civil servants who will assume responsibility for political positions during the time of transition.
In September 2007, Duke added, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff asked the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) to establish an Administration Transition Task Force to provide recommendations and best practices to the Department. The Task Force made several recommendations and grouped their recommendations into seven categories: Threat Awareness, Leadership, Congressional Oversight/Action, Policy, Operations, Succession and Training.
Finally, Duke said that the agency has organized a cadre of individuals including Senior and Deputy Transition Officers who are charged with evaluating internal processes, developing briefing materials to ensure operational effectiveness during the anticipated surge of incoming and exiting employees, and develop and implement a training exercise plan.
“We now have established a transition plan for our components,” Duke concluded, “ ensuring that the top leadership in each component includes career executives who will preserve continuity of operations before, during and after the administration transition. Of our 22 component agencies and program offices, 14 have career Civil Servants in the number one or number two positions while seven component agencies or program offices have only career civil servants in senior leadership positions.”
Acknowledging the efforts DHS has made so far Frank J. Chellino, Panel Chairman for the Department of Homeland Security Presidential Transition Study, National Academy of Public Administration, called DHS “well along in its transition training especially given that it is a young agency with a critical national mission and going through its first Presidential transition.”
Nonetheless pointed out what he saw as the major gaps in planning thus far. Specifically Chellino noted that the Academy recommends that DHS shift more executives to field locations in immigration and border management agencies and change non-career headquarters deputy officials, FEMA regional administrators and other officials to career executives.
Chellino also cited what he described as “gaps in DHS” executive staffing including, high turnover, many vacant positions, and a lack of ethnic and gender diversity. (Compiler's note: Someone please explain to the public just exactly what does "gender diversity" have to do with our national security.)
“DHS' actions are positive,” Chellino concluded, “ but there remain important areas that must be addressed if the department is to be completely prepared. To the greatest extent possible, incoming DHS leadership - including the Secretary and key staff—must be in place on Inauguration Day or shortly thereafter. This requires the support and cooperation of other federal agencies with background check and clearance responsibilities, as well as the Congress given it confirmation role and responsibilities.”
Picking up on Chellino’s points regarding congressional responsibility, John Rollins Specialist in Terrorism and National Security Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division The Congressional Research Service outlined what he believed are crucial areas for Congressional guidance over the next six to twelve months before and immediately after the inaugural.
“When one looks at the possibility of an attack occurring during the presidential transition period, combined with the suspected need for Al Qaeda to prove its continuing viability as an organization,” Rollins explained, “the enemy may see the upcoming transfer of power as too enticing to resist, and may choose to attempt a disruptive strike during this unique time in American politics rather than waiting for more advantageous conditions to attempt an attack.”
To address these concerns Rollins recommended that Congress request the current Administration to provide: the names of agency leaders responsible for making national security related decisions during the presidential transition period; briefings on the possible risks to the presidential transition process; information about the current status of transition planning activities, briefings about the Administration’s efforts to engage and collaborate with prospective new Administration senior security officials; and information about the funds appropriated for the purposes of the current presidential transition and how these monies are being used to support national and homeland security activities.
After January 20 Congressional support to the incoming Administration, Rollins, should include: prioritizing hearings for new Administration nominated political appointees who will have significant national security responsibilities; working with the new Administration to understand its national security priorities and, where applicable, have the changes in policies and programs reflected in the 2009 budget; and passing the FY2009 appropriations bills without undue delay.
“Other activities Congress may wish to consider, during the presidential transition period,” Rollins suggested, include “ providing a sense of the Congress resolution that notes the importance of effective and collaborative activities between the departing Administration and the incoming Administration; holding a special session of Congress soon after the election to ascertain what the outgoing and incoming Administrations have accomplished and will do with respect to transition-related activities; and quickly assigning new and existing Members of Congress to committees focusing on national security issues to allow these individuals to have the opportunity to understand better the issues for which they have oversight.”
Ms. Patricia McGinnis, President and Chief Executive Officer , Council for Excellence in Government, pointed out two additional areas of risk that will, she said, require leadership beyond the scope of DHS.
“First,” she said, “ from my vantage point, the training and exercises to prepare acting career officials and incoming appointees to assume their collaborative homeland security responsibilities across federal agencies do not seem to be as well coordinated as they should be. For the overall transition, each department and agency has named a senior career transition coordinator and the Deputy Director for Management at OMB is bringing them together to facilitate collaboration.”
“Also,” she added, “ the national security professionals training initiative is well underway and is convening leaders from security related agencies to focus on transition. And, the National Exercise Program, led by FEMA conducts scenario based exercises involving those with operational responsibilities from across the federal government (depending on the scenario). Nevertheless, there are many exercises and training programs that are not coordinated and as far as I know there is not a clearinghouse or repository of such activities and resources, to encourage coordination or “not reinventing the wheel” many times over.”
Finally, she warned, “very seldom do federal officials train or exercise with state and local leaders and first responders or private sector leaders. In our view, training and exercising together is the best way to ensure seamless, effective enterprise wide response to a major emergency. As our friends on the front lines at the local level often say, “you don’t want to be exchanging business cards during an emergency”. This is work to be done, related both to the transition period and our ongoing security.”
Beyond this McGinnis emphasized that addressing the potentially lengthy gap between the inauguration of the next president and the confirmation of key appointed leaders in key national and homeland security positions, is also crucial. “The Secretaries of Homeland Security, Defense, State and a few others, if not the whole cabinet, should be confirmed on Inauguration Day,” she said. “Then, they should not be “home alone”, with few if any confirmed deputies, undersecretaries and other critical appointees on board. The Executive Branch is working to expedite the security clearance process and according to the initial plan submitted to the President on April 30, 2008 by the Joint Security and suitability Reform Team, the time for security clearance determinations is down, on average, from 162 days in 2005 to 112 days currently. The goal is to reduce the time to 60 days, after reforms have been implemented and the investigative capacity is expanded.”
Previous administrative transitions have all had their challenges. In the past, however, incoming administrations and the federal bureaucracy more widely had some margin of error in their time frame for getting up to speed. With the stakes now higher than ever all participants in the transitional process now truly do need to be “ready on day one”. Insuring that this is so will require each critical agency and each manager within them to get out of their comfort zone in terms of cross-agency collaboration.
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